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UNITED STAiES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No. 11-20427-CIV-W ILLlAMS
DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC., ef a/.,
Plaintils,
VS.
HOTFILE CORP., et aI.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
THIS MATTER is before the Coud on several pending motions for summary
judgment, which were filed under seal and in a public, but redacted form (DE 255, DE
275, DE 276, DE 280, DE 3O1 , DE 316, DE 318, DE 322). In connection with this
briefing, the padies filed numerous related motions to strike (DE 217, DE 241, DE. 339,
DE 452, DE 371, DE 387), supplemental briefing permited by the Coud (DE 474, DE
475), and additional, robust pleadings on supplemental authority without Ieave of Coud
(DE 443, DE 444, DE 500, DE 501, DE 502, DE 503, DE 504, DE 505, DE 507, DE 509,
DE 510 DE 513 DE 514 DE 515 DE 516 DE 517 DE 523).1 Finaly, the Coud1 1 , T 1 1
permited the Electronic Frontier Foundation to file a brief as amicus curiae (DE 480).
The Coud addresses aII related filings in this Order. To the extent that this Order
discusses information considered by the padies to be business secrets, it wil be
redacted in a public version of this decision.
1 As evinced by the volume of the briefing and the proceeding discussion, the
padies do not agree on much, there are many facts asserted to be relevant, and
the Coud has been asked to weigh in on numerous unsettled Iegal issues.
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1-
This case concerns the actions of an off-shore technology company that provides
BACKGROUND
online file storage services, Defendant Hotfile Corp., and one of its founders, Defendant
Anton Titov (colectively, liHotfile' or l'Defendants'). Plaintiffs are five major media
studios and entertainment companies (colectively, the dstudios') that hold copyrights on
various adistic works: Disney Enterprises, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, Universal City Studios Productions LLLP, Columbia Pictures lndustries,
Inc., and W arner Bros. Entedainment Inc. ('W arner'). The gravamen of the Studios'
claim is that Hotfile's users have abused its system by sharing licensed m aterials
belonging to the Studios and that Hotfile and Titov are Iiable as a result.
The pending motions for summary judgment seek an adjudication that Hotfile's
activities are not (or are) entitled to a statutory safe harbor protection created by
Congress fifteen years ago in the Digital Milennium Copyright Act ('DMCA'), 17 IJ.S.C.
â 1201 , el seq.', that Hotfile is (or is not) Iiable for secondary copyright infringement at
common Iaw; that Titov is (or is not) personaly liable for Hotfile's activities as one of its
corporate officers and founders', and that W arner is not liable for itself abusing a system
that enabled it to remove works from Hoiile's system . After considering the extensive
factual record and applying the relevant Iaw, the Coud concludes that Defendants have
failed to meet criteria necessary for safe harbor protection', that Defendants are
vicariously liable for the actions of Hotfile's users, but that questions of fact preclude a
determ ination of other forms of secondary liability', that Titov is individualy liable for the
actions of his company, such that he wil have to share in whatever judgment Hotfile is
deemed to owe; and that Hotfile may proceed on a counterclaim it filed against W arner
2
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relating to notices of infringement. This action will proceed to trial on aII unresolved
issues of Iiability as wel as for a determination of the measure of damages.
A. Hotfile's System
Hotfile, which began its operations on February 19, 2009, is what is known as an
online 'storage Iocker.' The company operates an lnternet website that allows
registered users to take electronic files of any type that are stored on their computers or
other accessible Iocations and transfer them to Hotfile's electronic storage system
through an uploading process. As a result, a copy of that file then exists on Hotfile's
servers. The website provides a simple interface between Hotfile users (and their data)
and Hotfile's storage network, connecting them with just a few computer mouse clicks.
Once a file is uploaded, the uploading user automatically receives one or more unique
URL Iinks containing the file name and an extension. So, for example, if a user uploads
a piece of software caled l'JDownloader' - which is a real program whose authors
voluntarily uploaded it through Hotfile's website - Hotfile would issue the user a link
location such as 'http://ho;ile.com/dl/14052520/7a3c8f8/JDownIoader%20O.8.821 .
zip.html.' As can be seen, the Iink generaly gives some indication of the file name, and
thus, its possible content. By entering that link into the address bar of any Internet web
browser on any computer, the user may retrieve and download his file. Hotfile keeps
track of the date, time of use, and cedain user information associated with the fiIe.2
2 This case revolves around emerging technologies, which requires the Coud to
give an overview of the relevant concepts. The padies have provided more
comprehensive information and more sophisticated analyses, which are on file
with the Coud. (See, e.g., Foster Decl. (DE 325-17).)
3
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W hile an individual's act of uploading a file is ostensibly innocuous - and indeed,
other networks provide similar sods of services - several of Hotfile's attributes facilitate
users' infringement of copyrights. First, while the uploading process places just one
copy of the file on Hotfile's servers, that file can be downloaded an unlimited num ber of
times. Moreover, there are no Iimitations as to how someone can fudher use or
replicate the file.
Second, because the file is not secure, it is accessible to anyone with an Internet
connection. It is impodant to note that Hotfile provides no index or search feature,
which means that anyone trying to access a file must know its exact Iocation or URL -
the file is essentialy hidden in plain sight. Nevedheless, ways exist for other users to
Iearn about and gain access to files. For instance, Hotfile encourages users to share
file Iinks (and thus files) through an affiliate program, which pays individuals to navigate
prospective downloaders to file Iocations. The incentives increase with the size of the
file and the frequency of its download but without regard to other characteristics the file
might possess (e.g., if it is entedainment media versus utility computer software or if it is
d b the user or created by someone eIse).3 ln practice, Hotfile's affiliates havecreate y
created their own websites that catalogue files found on Hotfile, promote their files, or
allow the public to search for files. In addition, uploading users can themselves
broadcast the download Iinks, such as by e-mailing them to people they know or by
3 The amounts paid per file - no more than $0.015 - are small, but in aggregate
have resulted in the payment of millions of dollars to affiliates. Prior to 2012,
Hotfile also paid website owners a five percent comm ission based on the number
of users who purchased premium subscriptions to Hotfile and had been referred
by such websites.
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advedising them through various channels. This has turned Hotfile into not only a
storage site, but also a file distribution network.
Finaly, because Hotfile protects users' privacy, it has effectively refrained from
interfering in any way with how its members use the service. In the normal course of its
business, for exam ple, Hotfile does not review what its users are uploading,
downloading or promoting. Indeed, as discussed below, one of Hotfile's main defenses
in this action is that it is unaware of the nature of the content available and has no
affirmative duty to monitor user activities.
Hotfile has sought to increase the use of its system and expand the rate of file
sharing because the corporation derives revenue through subscriber fees that users pay
to it. Indeed, this is Hotfile's sole source of revenue. W hile Hotfile is accessible to the
public and anyone can upload or download for free, paying nine dollars per month for
S'premium' status permits uploaders to store their files for a Ionger period', otherwise,
files are automaticaly deleted every three months. Moreover, premium users who seek
to download files benefit from easier access, faster download speeds, and the ability to
download files frequently', they would otherwise be restricted to one download every
thidy minutes. Hotfile calculates that user activity drives premium subscriptions while
rewarding users for giving away access to files they possess. For instance, it is
undisputed that Hoiile's affiliate program promotes the use of Hotfile and leads users to
conved to premium status.
By any measure, Hotfile's model has been effective at encouraging user
padicipation and driving growth among downloading users, uploading users and a'Kiliate
members. For instance, according to Hotfile's figures, 123 million files available on
5
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Hotfile's system have been downloaded 2.9 bilion times - 145 milion times alone in the
m onth preceding this lawsuit - and have resulted in the registration of 5.3 million users.
(Titov Deci. !( 36 (DE 396-1).) This has worked a significant financial benefit to Hotfile
and its founders.
B. Legal Claims at Issue
As alluded to above,these features - the ease of replication and dissemination
of any type of file, the Iack of oversight regarding content, and the scale of Hotfile's
activity - raise questions of Iiability for users' illegal activities.4 In their Complaint filed
on February 8, 2O1 1 (DE 1), the Studios alege that while Hotfile proclaims to be an
online personal storage site, actualy designed to provide a mechanism for
uploading and downloading users to engage in digital piracy, com plete with a system of
4 S stems with similar capabilities have faced careful scrutiny. For instance, in theY
late 1990s and early 200Os, copyright owners brought numerous successful
challenges to peer-to-peer file networks! which coordinated the transmission of
media stored on users' computers directly to other users, im posing liability on the
network operators for the conduct of their users. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer Studios; Inc. v. Groksten Ltd. j 545 U.S. 913 (2005) ', A&M Recordst Inc. v.
Napslec lnc., 239 F,3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001),. Arista Records LLC B. Lime Group
LLC, 784 F. Supp, 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 201 1) ('L/me Gro&p'). The system
challenged most recently Megaupload Limited, shuttered its service in early
!2012 and is facing potentlal criminal and civil liability in the United States. See
Ben Sisario, 7 Charged as F.B.I. Closes a Top File-sharing Site, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 19, 2012, at B1. W hile the parties have found it convenient to compare
Hotfile to these systems, the Cotfrt predicates its decision on the facts and law
presented by this record.
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financial incentives that fosters infringement. They assed that it is Hotfile's infringing
uses, not Iegitimate user activity, that drives the company's business. The Studios bring
a claim for secondary infringement (Count 11)., their claim for direct infringement (Count 1)
was dismissed by prior order of the Coud (DE 94). To frame the Iegal issues and put
into context the evidence discussed throughout this decision, the Coud provides the
following summary of the padies' positions and their key evidence.
Although Iargely irrelevant to issues of Iiability, the cornerstone of the Studios'
case is a statistical analysis conducted by Dr. Richard W aterman based on
5 Theclassifications provided by their proffered copyright exped
, 
Mr. Scott A. Zebrak.
repod concludes that 90.2% of the daily downloads on Hotfile are downloads of
'infringing' or 'highly infringing' content and that only 5.3% of downloads are
noninfringing, with a 1 .30/c margin of error. (W aterman Decl. jl!l 22-23 (DE 325-6).) The
Studios also provide circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that Hotfile does not serve a
S As explained in more detail below, couds have squarely rejected the Studios'
position that generalized evidence of infringement, such as Dr. W aterman's
study, forecloses the statutory safe harbor protection afforded by the DMCA and
necessitates a finding of Iiability. Although the Studios cite to dicta suppoding
the proposition that the goals of the DMCA are inconsistent with rewarding those
who knowingly contribute to infringement (but mean to protect innocent actors
who are engaged in beneficial applications of technology), a Iitigant must point to
evidence of known infringement padicular to works that they own. For instance,
in Viacom Intj Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012), the Second
Circuit found that a defendant could not be said to have awareness of
infringement where an internal survey revealed that 75 to 80 percent of aII
content on the system was infringing. Id. at 32-34. As another case recently
summarized, 'knowledge of the prevalence of infringing activity, and welcoming
it, does not itself forfeit the safe harbor. To fofeit that, the provider must
influence or padicipate in the infringement.' Viacom Intj Inc. v. YouTube, /nc.,
No. 07 Civ. 2103 (LLS), 2013 W L 1689071, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2013).
Outside the scope of the DMCA, general knowledge of infringement is a factor
suppoding secondary liability for infringement but cannot establish such Iiability
on its own.
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prim arily lawful purpose, as discussed below. Fudher, they contend that Hotfile knows
about rampant infringement of works owned by the Studios and others, that Hotfiie
failed to remove infringing material or disable the accounts of users who uploaded such
material despite having received eight milion infringement notices from copyright
holders, and that Hotfile and its uploading users have profited from the infringing
activity. As a result, the Studios contend that Hotfile is Iiable under various theories of
secondary copyright infringement and that it cannot avail itself of a safe harbor created
in favor of service providers by Congress through Section 512 of the DMCA.
For its part, Hotfile podrays itself as anything but a pirate network. Hotfile and its
founders claim that the corporation's business model is not unusual for the industry.
And they contend that the system is used predom inantly for storage and other legitim ate
uses, such as distributing non-licensed software; Mspace shiftingn (i.e., enabling
individual users to access their media through another device they ownl', and the
sharing of media that is either created by users (such as videos to promote political
change), freely Iicensed (or altogether not copyrighted), or too large to send by other
methods. For example, Hotfile points to the fact tha
Further, through its expeds, Hotfile attempts to underm ine the Studios'
infringement analyses, contending that the W aterman study exam ined only a one-month
period of data from January 201 1 (leaving the possibility but hugely improbable
6 No other Piaintifs appear to have done so.
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Iikelihood that there was a zero percent infringement rate in other months prior to this
lawsuit) and improperly excluded entire categories of files, such as those with adult
content, which is often given away with the copyrightholders' perm ission, and public
domain material, including works whose copyrights have expired. Hotfile does concede
that, at least to some degree,infringement has occurred through its system and the
availability of infringing files drives conversions
Nonetheless, to the extent that infringement did transpire on its system , Hotfile claims to
have been unaware of it.
paid prem ium accounts.
Hotfile also asserts that to the extent this Iitigation has highlighted ways it could
beter police the activity of its users, it has done so (even if it was not required to). This
appears to be true. For example, when aleded by the Studios'Iawsuit to the presence
of infringing content, Hotfile implemented S'powerful countermeasures' against lnternet
piracy, such as adopting filtering technologies and terminating large numbers of repeat
infringers, that go beyond the most rudimentary foils to such activities. ln this way,
Hotfile advances the claim that it is a smal, foreign company that has done everything
possible to investigate its users'backgrounds, implement countermeasures to defeat
piracy, and comply with United States copyright Iaw (with which it says it was not always
familiar). Finaly, Hotfile asseds that the Studios have an improper motive in bringing
this Iawsuit, claiming that they stood witness to, and were complicit in, the aleged
violations in order to drive damages and recover post hoc.
C. Evidence of Hotfile's Intent
The padies have diametrically different views of Hotfile's aims and have devoted
much space to debating whether Hotfile set out to serve a legitimate purpose. Hotfile
9
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acknowledges that at its inception, it modeled itself after Rapidshare, another online
storage Iocker website. Notably, copyright holders eventualy claimed that Rapidshare
was used for infringement and brought suit against it in June 2010 to shut the network
down. Hotfile was aware of Rapidshare's problems. After the Rapidshare Iawsuit was
filed, one of Hotfile's co-founders, , sent an e-mail to Titov noting an
increase in traffic on Hotfile's system and remarking, ulwlhat an unexpected gift we have
from Rapidshare :) The bad thing is that they clean up their image while we becolme
the fiagship of non-licensed content.' (Yeh Decl. Ex. 53 (DE 288-58 (filed under seal;
DE 324-11).) One month Iater, spectllated that one reason that 'our prosts
increased so rapidly' was that 'Holywood has closed 3-4 large websites for illegal
movies and that could have redirected users to us.' (Yeh Decl. Ex. 49 (DE 288-54 (filed
under seal', DE 324-1 1).) Titov responded to that e-mail by specifically naming
Rapidshare.
Apad from the generalized statistics highlighted earlier, the Studios have
provided a pastiche of evidence related to Hotfiie's business m odel, design and use tlnat
they contend makes a circumstantial case that Hotfile understood it was making illegal
content available for distribution and tacitly fostering such activity. For instance, the fact
that Hotfile encouraged downloading activity - by deleting fiies that are not frequently
downloaded and by paying members only for downloading activity - means that Hotfile
was intended to be a distribution network and not merely a storage facility. As a
corolary, the Studios contend that Hotfile's affiliate compensation structure rewarded
the sharing of Iarger and popJ/ar content, which drove premium conversions and
earned revenue for the network.
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On the other hand, Hotfile presents evidence that it conducts its affairs without
regard to the nature of the content available on its system (i.e., protected by copyright or
otherwise) or user activity (e.g., storage, sharing, streaming, etc.). Hotfile's exped, Dr.
Boyle, challenges the Studio's claims about the conversion rate. Even the Studios'
exped, Dr. lan Foster, acknowledges that entedainment media, which may or may not
be protected and which Hotfile users may or may not have had permission to share, can
be a single large file, or Sdivided into several, smaler computer files in order to facilitate
transmission or copying.' (Foster Decl. !! 8 (DE 325-17).)
The Studios also point to specific documents to refute Hotfile's claims that it did
not understand what was occurring on its system.
Hotfile engineers discussing
stated that 'dwhat is protecting us Iegaly is the fact that we don't know what is up there
on our site. If we know, then we are susceptible to Iawsuits. And now according to the
IP policy, 10 days after a repod, we pretend we don't know.' (Yeh Decl. Ex. 54 (DE
For instance, in an e-mail between
the company's intellectual propedy policy, one of them
288-59 (filed under seal; DE 324-1 1).) The Studios argue that Hotfile turned a blind
eye to infringement. Moreover, as previously cited, Hotfile acknowledged (or at Ieast
expressed the concern) in the Summer of 2010 that it was becoming d'the flagship of
non-licensed content' and capturing infringing traffic from competing systems. And as
discussed in the DMCA context below, Hotfile received millions of notices from
copyright holders claiming that their rights to padicular works were being infringed yet
failed to target the associated users, failed to remove other identical copies of the works
from the system (and only removed offending Iinks and not the offending files), and did
not implement robust counter-piracy tools until after this lawsuit was filed.
11
Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW   Document 534   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013   Page 11 of 99
W ith regard to Hotfile's affiliate program, the Studios contend that because of
'sfacialy pirate' affiliate sites Iike dlcopymovie.net' - a website that, from screenshots,
apparently displayed popular movies' promotional materials and may have been
embedded With Hotfile download links - Hotfile should have understood the availability
of copyrighted content. (Yeh Decl. Ex. 35 (DE 324-3).) ln fact, Hotfile had several run-
ins with affiliates regarding piracy. ln one internal discussion, for example, an em ployee
named 'Andrei' reached out to Titov about an affiliate site called dtplanetsuzy' that was
'conveding wel' but had somehow strained its relationship with Hotfile. Titov
responded that ùdit must not appear in any way that we pay for advedising on a
pornography site, where piracy activity prospers.' (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 104 (DE 288-1 16
(filed under seal; DE 324-17).)
unwillingness to deal with
recently paid this affiliate during the period spanning January 16, 2012 through January
22, 2012 . suggesting that Hotfile is continuing to make payments to this website
today.' (Foster Decl. !! 56 (DE 286 (filed under seal; DE 325-17).)
The Studios also point to other Hotfile communications with affiliates.
Instructions on Hotfile's system addressed to its affiliates stated that third-party site
W hile Hotfile suggests that the document shows its
infringers, the Studios provide evidence that 'sHotfile most
owners can get a commission equal to five percent of aII prem ium accounts they sell, so
those third-padies should l'lpjost interesting download links' in order to 'earn big
money.' (Yeh Decl. Ex. 57 (DE 324-1 1) (emphasis addedl.) Other instructions to
afiliates suggest uploading l'files only if you intenldl to promote them.' (Yeh Decl. Ex.
59 (DE 324-1 1).)
Hotfile, Andrew lanakov, solicited affiliates by posting ona website that l'lojur goal is to
And, around the time of Hotfile's founding, someone a/iliated with
12
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reach people who are interested in this kind of business, and to find good uploaders . . .
uploading some stuff - mp3, videos, applications, games on
these Iinks over . . . forums where download Iinks are posted
our file host and spread
(to games, applications
and so on).' (Yeh Decl. Ex. 60 (DE 324-12).)
Apad from affiliates, evidence of similar communications exists between Hotfile
and its uploading and downloading users. One user seeking technical assistance, for
instance, stated that tlim a premium user n im trying to download from the below Iink but
after clicking download button, page not found appears http://ho#iIe.com/dI/8651708/
cad2aa3/DespicabIe.Me.2010.720p.BRRip.XViD.AC3-FLAW L3SS.pad6rar.htmI.' (Yeh
Decl. Ex. 54 (DE 288-31 (filed under seal; DE 324-1 1).) Someone at Hotfile apparently
responded with download instructions. The Studios contend that the file name identified
above should have aleded Hotfile to the fact that a user was attempting to ilegally
download a podion of the popular movie Despicable Me. Beyond this example, the
evidence shows that whenever Hotfile was contacted by users, the title of the file Iast
accessed by that user was revealed.
In another document, a Hotfile user complained that he was unable to expod files
that had been uploaded from Hotfile to other services because those services 'iwrote me
that aI my files are BLACKLISTED.' (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 719:2-21 . (DE
288-3 (filed under seal; DE 324-2).) Someone atHotfile responded that 'lslince the
specific value is identical to a value marked illegal in our system, uploads are denied.
W e suggest to contact your hoster in this matter. Unfodunately, due to security and
Iegal matters, the blockage of the value cannot be Iifted.' (Id. (emphasis addedl.) And
Titov commented in an internal e-mail that dlwe generally do not suppod transferring files
13
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from our System out and that is not a problem that we need to give much consideration.'
(Id. at 721:4-10.) ln this regard, Hotfile argues that the files were non-transferrable for
reasons independent of copyright', they were essentially blank files. But the Studios
rejoin that the inference to be drawn is that Hotile had notice that the user's files were
infringing because they had been blocked by the other service.
Similarly, one podion of Hotfile's website allowed users to test whether a Hotfile
Iink was operational. According to a screen shot, Hotfile provided the instructional
example of t'hdp://hotfile.com//dl/l8zg87/czd67b8/pcD.DolDomination.zoog.rar.html.'
(Yeh Decl. Ex. 44 (DE 324-1 1).) The Studios contend that the Iink used as an
illustration contained an album by dl-rhe Pussycat Dols' called 'tDolI Domination' and
that other copyrighted works were used in other tutorials illustrating Hotfile's functions.
Hotfile argues that even if the file contained what the Studios assed it contained, this
padicular band authorizes cedain works for online distribution, as one coud has
recognized. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (concluding that the defendant network did not have actual knowledge
of infringing material where it knew that works by padicular adists were available for
download since they were uploaded by adists themselves, such as The Pussycat Dols).
D. Additional Facts Relevant to Hotfile's DMCA Defense
As explained more fully below, Section 512 of the DMCA confers immunity 'from
aI monetary relief' on Internet service providers that meet cedain criteria with regard to
storing infringing material and making it accessible. Principaly, with respect to the
network at issue here, a requirement for eligibility contained in Section 512(i) along with
several other requisites contained in Section 512(c) mandate:that the defendant has a
14
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policy, reasonably implemented, for terminating repeat infringers', that it is a qualified
service provider', that it has properly registered a DMCA agent', that it does not have
actual or 'red flag' knowledge of the infringing nature of files stored on its system ; that it
takes down files that are the subject of an infringement notice', that it does not receive a
direct financial benefit from the alleged infringing activity; that it does not have the
practical ability to control the alleged infringements; and that it accommodates and does
not interfere with standard
statute does not focus on the
affirmative action to police content, and does not preclude a grant of immunity even if
the operator knew or should have known of infringement generaly. The padies'
technical measures used to protect content. Notably, the
general characteristics of the network, does not require
motions in this case concern in pad whether Hotfile has met those requirements and, as
a result, whether Hotfile became eligible for safe harbor protection at any point.
1. Infringement Notices and
Hotfile's Repeat Infringer Policy
Under the DMCA, lnternet service providers must reasonably implement a policy
designed to terminate users identified as repeat infringers. To that end, since May
2010, Hotfile has provided its users with notice of a repeat infringem ent policy through
the terms of service provided on its website.(Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 279: 1-4
(DE 324-2).) That policy states thatHotfile 'discontinuelsl service to users who
repeatedly make such content available or otherwise violate HotFile's Terms of Service.
Please do not abuse the HotFile service by using it to distribute materials to which you
do not have the rights.' (Titov Decl. j!r 17-19 (DE 321-1).) Prior to that time, Hotfile
had warned users that l'Islervices of Hotfile can be used in Iegitimate objectives.
Transmission, distribution, or storage of any materials that violate Iaws is forbidden.
15
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This includes without restriction patented materials, copyright laws, trademarks,
commercial secrets and other intelectual propedy rights.' (Id. !r 12.) lt had also posted
an e-mail address on its website - abuse@ hotfile.com - that the public could use to
alert Hotfile of infringement. Although the policies essentially ask users not to engage in
m isconduct and warn that they may be excluded from using Hotfile, they are notably
silent as to what criteria Hotfile would consider in terminating repeat infringers and what
effods it would undedake in doing so. It is undisputed that Hotfile terminated only
approxim ately 43 users up to the filing of the Complaint,
It is clear from the record that Hoiile's repeat infringer policy was not tied to
tices of infringement it received from copyright owners under the DMCA.Z By the timeno
this Complaint was filed, for instance, ten miqlion such notices had been sent to the
company with respect to links to files available on its system. (Foster Decl. % 25 (DE
325-17) (discussing data produced by Hotfilel.) Both sides agree that those notices
correspond to approximately eight milion unique files. (/d.; Titov Decl. !1 26 (DE 396-
Hotfile acknowledges that it made no connection between infringement notices
and acts of infringement. Hotfile explains that it did not track the notices and did not
base its policy on how many notices were associated with cedain users (such as by
'flagging' them). (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 283:24-285:15 (DE 324-2).) Titov
1 The DMCA sets out a notice protocol under which copyright holders can notify an
agent responsible for the service of claimed infringement. See 17 U.S.C. j
512(c)(3),' Hendrickson k'. e8ay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (C.D. Cal.
2001). The statute also alows service providers to chalenge infringement
designations through a counter-notification process.
16
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said as much at his deposition, acknowledging that when Hotfile received a DMCA
notice of infringement, it did not record which user it corresponded to:
Q. Prior to the filing of this Complaint, when Hotfile received a DMCA notice
from a copyright owner, did Hotfile attempt to identify the user who had
uploaded the offending file?
MR. THOMPSON: Objection, overbroad.
A. I don't believe that would be the case most of the time. But again, on
discretion, employees could investigate fudher.
* * *
Q. . . . . Absent a request, a specific request by a copyright owner, prior to the
filing of this action, did Hotfile have a practice of identifying the user who
had uploaded files identified as infringing on DMCA notices?
MR. THOMPSON: Objection.Overbroad, asked and answered.
I won't say 'specific request,' but if a copyright holder would raise some
kind of concern that I - I think can be - can be sum marized, again, a
discretion, identification could be made.
BY M R. FABRIZIO:
Q . Okay. My question, though, is without a request from a copyright owner,
when Hotfile received a DMCA notice, did Hotfile, as a matter of practice,
identify the user who had uploaded the offending file?
MR. THOMPSON: Objection.Asked and answered.
I don't believe so.
(Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 281:10-282:15 (DE 324-2).) W hile Hotfile did not track
A .
such notices, Titov, as the designated corporate Rule 30(b)(6) representative regarding
Hotfile's electronicaly stored information, testified that Hotfile knows the user identity for
every upload and that it would have been a lstrivial task' to extract user identities from
infringement notices. (Yeh Decl. Ex. 2 (Titov ESI Dep.) at 51:23-52:4 (DE 288-4 (filed
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under seal; DE 324-2).) In sum, prior to this action, whether a user was the subject of
one notice or 300 notices, Hotfile acted no differently in terms of investigating possible
infringement.
Instead, in its briefs, Holile credits a system of 'smanual review' and d'discretion'
for the term ination of 43 users. However, the Studios' evidence demonstrates that
Hotfile was motivated not by policy, but by the threat of Iitigation. Of those 43
terminations, 33 were due to a court's temporary restraining order issued in connection
with Iitigation initiated by a pornography producer caled 'iLibedy Mediax' (Yeh. Decl.
Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 299:1-24 (DE 288-2 (filed under seal; DE 324-2).) Others were
apparently terminated when Hotfile or its affiliated entities received Iitigation threats from
copyright holders. (See, e.g., id. at 306:12-307:10 (acknowledging that Hotfile
terminated a user after a copyright owner complained of Hotfile's failure to respond to
DMCA notices and threatening to hold Hotfile Iiable for d'a huge Ioss to my company'l.)
Thus, while Hotfile claims to have acted to 'terminate, and stop payments to accounts of
users with numerous complaints at content owners' request,' it has failed t() cite
evidence to suppod the proposition, explain the conditions that led it to target or
terminate users, or rebut the Studios' account of user termination only by Iitigation.
(See Titov Decl. :1 34 (stating only that 'Hotfile did review accounts of users with
numerous complaints at the request of content owners, did perform manual reviews of
those accounts, did terminate those accounts, and did stop payments') (DE 342-2 (filed
under seal; DE 396-1).)
Similarly, Hotfile's public claims about its repeat infringerpolicy appear to be
unfounded. For example, it purpoded to have a policy of automaticaly removing users
18
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that had accumulated two dtstrikes,' based on DMCA notices; the policy was discussed
in internal e-mails. (&ee Liebnitz Ex. 29 (DE 346-31) at HF02835779 ('$lf user's files
were repoded two times as copyright
repoded to copyright holders that it acted upon the
received, but vetted them manually to ensure that
abuse we delete user account.'lv) Hotfile also
notices of infringement that it
the users it deleted had in fact
infringed. (/d.) Likewise, internal documents suggest that Hotfile had a ldsystem in place
that flags the users (with) numerous infringing (Complaintsl' and that the corporation
'manualy reviewledl those accounts,' deleted them, and seized funds they have
received from their affiliate program. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 28626-18 (DE
288-2 (filed under seal; DE 324-2).)
In his deposition, Titov acknowledged that those representations were untrue.
(See, e.g., Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 286:6-289:4 (DE 324-2).) lndeed, had
Hotfile paid attention to the DMCA notices, it would have known that by the time of the
Complaint, 24,790 users had accum ulated more than three notices', half of those had
more than ten notices', half again had 25 notices', 1,217 had 100 notices', and 61 had
more than 300 notices.(Foster Decl. 111 42-52 & Ex. D. (DE 286 (filed under seal; DE
325-17).) Moreover, documents produced in the Iitigation suppod the conclusiorl that,
prior to the filing of the Complaint, Hotfile Iacked any meaningful policy to combat
infringement. Although it is the subject of a motion to strike on the grounds of hearsay
and authenticity, one document purpods to show a conversation thread in which a
Hotfile user observes in an online forum that dlilf any of youlr) files are repoded by a real
representative (see http:/hoiile.com/repodabuse.html), then the file wil be deleted, but
your account wil not be removed, and you wil not be suspended from hotfile.com.'
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(Yeh. Decl. Ex. 22 (DE 288-25 (5Ied under seal; DE 324-2).) Similarly, another user
who operated a site with Hotfile Iinks, which the Studios suggest was 'blatantly'
infringing, was suspended but allegedly had his account restored after contacting
Hotfile. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 100 (DE 288-112 (filed under seal', DE 324-16).) The Studios'
expert calculated that this particular user had uploaded nearly 30 thousand files to
Hotfile and received but had also
accumulated 9,254 takedown notices. (Foster Decl. :1 54 (DE 286 (filed under seal; DE
325-17).) To the extent that they may be admissible at trial, these documents give
substance to the Studios' assertions.
Like that user, the evidence produced shows that the subjects of the notices
formed a discreet group of problematic users. While those who were the subject of
more than three infringem ent notices made up Iess than one percent of alI of Hoïle's
users,8 they were responsible for posting 50 milion files (15.6 milion of which were
subsequently the subject of a takedown notice or removed for infringement),
representing 44 percent of aII files ever uploaded to Hotfile. (Foster Decl. 11 41 (DE 286
(filed under seal; DE 325-17).) Those same files were downloaded nearly 1 .5 bilion
8 The fact that these users were few in number but had a Iarge aggregate impact
(padicularly with respect to downloaded files) accounts for the discrepancies
between the padies' proffered statistics, as does the fact that the Studios focus
only on toial downloading activity. For instance, Hotfile argues that only four
percent of files ever uploaded have been the subject of a DMCA notice', that
three percent have been removed by copyright holders under Hotfile's Special
Rightsholder Account program ', that the most popular downloads are not
copyrighted', and that 56 percent of the files uploaded have never been
downloaded. Further, because Hotfile made significant changes to its system
after this lawsuit was filed, including implementing a three-strikes policy and
various fingerprinting technologies to seek out infringing content, additional
discrepancies are attributable to the time period analyzed, Supported by post-
Complaint data, Hotfile asseds it has been more proactive in identifying and
removing infringing files and users.
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times, representing roughly half of aII downloads ever from Hotfile. (/d.)
(1d.) lr1 turn, the Conversion rate evidence ShOWS that
Flotfile earned iarge SUIMS from neW Premium tlsers. Significantly, a snapshot taken by
the Studios showed that their files accounted for one percent of the files on Hotfile, or
945,61 1 files. W ith regard to downloads, however, ten percent of files downloaded from
Hotfile (according to the Studios' dcwnload study) were owned or controled by the
Studios.
W hile Hotfile's efforts to control infringers' activity appears to have been
ineffective (whatever its policy might have been), Hotfile adopted a 'revamped repeat
infringer policy' immediately after this Iitigation began. The new policy focuses on
'three strikes' - terminating and banning users who receive three DMCA notices of
claimed infringement or Special Rightsholder Account requests (discussed below).
(Titov Decl. !1 33 (DE 321-1).) Hotfiie now tracks how many times it receives notices of
infringement, each of wbich count as a 'strike.' (ld.) This revamped policy Ied diredly
to the termination of 444 of its 500 highest-paid affiliates, although thousands of sm aler
afiliates were not terminated. (Titov Decl. !( 30 (DE 396-1 ).) Ultimately, Hotfile
terminated 22,447 users within months of the filing of the Complaint. (Titov Decl. :11 34,
37 (DE 342-1 (filed under seal', DE 396-1).) Hotfile cites this evidence in support of its
argument that it is now DMCA compliant, while the Studios tlse the evidence to show
how rampant and unchecked user activity had been. And Hotfie points out that the
number of users removed is, in relative terms, a sm al num ber.
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2. DMCA Agent Registration
Another requirement of DMCA protection is that a registered agent be designated
to receive infringement notices. At Ieast as far back as April 24, 2009, Hotfile
maintained an e-mail address posted on its website for the public to repod illegitimate or
ilegal user activity.At that time, the website explained to users that tltlo exercise your
Proper DMCA Notice must be sent to Designated Agent of
abuse@ hotfile.com . W hen a Proper DMCA notification is
DMCA rights, your
hotfile.com to email:
received by Designated Agent, or when hotfile.com becomes aware that copyrights are
infringed, it will remove or disable access to infringing materials as soon as possible.'
(Titov Decl. 1 15 (DE 321-1).) Hotfile formaly registered a DMCA agent with the
Copyright Office in December 2009, a fact that is undisputed. (Titov Decl. !! 16 (DE
321-1).) Thereafter, in May 2010, it posted a policy expressly incorporating the DMCA,
inform ing users of its repeat infringer policy and the contact information for its
designated agent. (Gupta Decl. Ex. 6 (W arner Interrog. Resps.) (DE 275-4 (filed under
seal; DE 320-7).) It is fudher undisputed that the agent address provided by Hotfile
was a post office box, which the Studios contend fails to comply with the statute.
3. Other Infringement Counterm easures
ln addition to targeting repeat infringers' accounts,Hotfile makes m uch of other
countermeasures it has put into place, largely after this litigation began. For instance,
Titov stated that Hotfile's current practice is to remove individual files within 48 hours of
receiving a notice, which he believes Hotfile does 95% of the time. (Titov Decl. % 19
(DE 321-1).) The Studios do not dispute that since February 201 1 , Hotfile has adhered
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to this practice, although the Studios have submitted documents suggesting that in
some instances, Hotfile might not have always done so.
ln August 2009, Hotfile implemented a Special Rightsholder Account (tdSRA')
program after receiving a request for a 'takedown tool' from Plaintiff W arner. (Titov
Decl. 11 20 (DE 321-1).). The program, which gives rise to Hotfile's counterclaim against
W arner, allows trusted content owners who attest that they own rights to protected
works to have access to Hotfile's system. This is a m uch quicker ajternative than the
user termination prompted by a DMcA-compliant infringement notice. Indeed, the
padies have stipulated that notifications by the Studios through the SRA program have
the e#ect of notices of infringement for purposes of the DMCA. (DE 151, at 2
(dlW arner's notifications by means of Hotfile's SRA are (and have the effect of)
notifications of claimed infringement to Hotfile's designated agent under 17 U.S.C. j
512(c)(3)(A), and are therefore subject to 17 U.S.C. j 51249.').) Through an interface
provided by Hotfile, owners are permitted to identify and automaticaly remove offending
Iinks without any action by Hotfile. According to record evidence, at Ieast one of the
Studios, W arner, has padicipated in this program .
Finaly, Hotfile now actively polices files on
advanced filtering technology. Video fingerprinting implemented in September 201 1 is
capable of identifying copyrighted content, which Hotfile claims to then block. (Titov
Decl. !( 35 (DE 321-1).) Hotfile has also used so-caled 'hashing techno4ogy' (possibly
9 to remove identical copies of files once one is found 'to besince August 2009 )
its network, principally through
infringing. This is a revision of the Ismaster file policy' - something sharply criticized by
9 w hile Titov stated in his declaration that the technology was implemented in
August 2009, his deposition testimony is not consistent with that assedion.
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the Studios - in which Hotfile saved server space by maintaining only one copy of
identical files uploaded by different users. Formerly, when Hotfile received a claim of
infringement, it disabled any offending Iinks but did not actualy remove the file from the
server, thus Ieaving it accessible for download with a different Iink. And finally, Hotfile is
employing other video and audio filtering technology that identifies files with
characteristics matching content registered by copyright owners, which Hotfile then
impact these technologies haveblocks. It is unclear what
infringing files that were already
according to Hotfile, they have two significant, remedial outcomes: (1) Hotfile now
removes aII infringing files to the extent that its sophisticated technology can identify
them; and (2) the low percentage of files currently identified and blocked (in the range of
had in blocking access to
available at the time the Complaint was filed. But,
two to four percent in
share infringing files. (See Gupta Decl. Ex. 38 (DE 321-39).)
E. Corporate History and Titov's Involvement
The Studios' Iast claim is against Titov individualy because of his padicipation in,
and ability to benefit from , the infringing activity present on Hotfile's network. ln
February 2012) demonstrates that Hotfile is no longer used to
padicular, paragraph 45 of the
reliant business model', designed the aforementioned affiliate program that promotes
infringement and paid infringing users;
Complaint states that Titov adopted an infringement-
planned technologicalfeatures that both
frustrated copyright enforcement and failed to prevent infringement by users; managed
Hotfile's operations; and operated related businesses to evade liability. W hile Hotfile
makes much of the fact that the Studios have been unable to prove up aII of these
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alegations, it is m ore significant that several of them are actually suppoded by the
evidence produced in discovery.
As background, Hotfile is the successor to a business venture
Although it is unclear how Titov first became involved with or what
exactly the company was formed to do. it is undisputed that Titov pe/ormed software
programing, search engine optimization and server administration for the company. At
some point, devised the idea for an online file hosting company based on a
com petitor in the market, Rapidshare. Thus, provided the
necessary stad-up capital for Hotfile Corp. Titov was approached because of his
technical expedise and prior web-hosting experience', he joined them in founding Hottile
in Fal 2008. Hotfile acknowledges that the 'researched the competition in this
space to learn about the functionalities of other services' and agreed on Holile's
business model. They then staffed the company almost entirely with
employees, who continue to work for Hotfiie. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 105:5-7
(DE 288-1 (filed under seall', DE 324-2).)
The evidence shows that Titov's primary roje at Hotfile is as a technical engineer,
responsible for im pjementing business ideas and functions. For instance, the padies
agree that Titov wrote the source code that runs Hotfile's website. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1
(Titov Dep.) at 497:3-7 (DE 288-2 (filed under seal; DE 324-2) (acknowledging writing
between 50 and 70 percent of the source codel', Yeh Decl. Ex, 88 (Titov DecI.) at !( 6
(DE 288-95 (fijed under seal; DE 324-15) (.'1 wrote the source code for Hotfile's website
with the assistance of one other person. W e designed the source code from scratch.
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My conservative estimate is that more than 1,000 hours have been spent developing
the source code.').) Titov also provides 'dguidancen to employees and
oversees aspects of their work for Hotfile. (Jd. at 132:8-20 OI'm not sure that I do in fact
supervise them but . . . to the extent they need some guidance and understanding of the
technical parts of . . . our system , yes we do comm unicate, and - yes, I would say that I
have certain authority over them.').)
The evidence demonstrates that Titov actively participates in the management of
Hotfile and in decision-making.
Titov testified that Hotfile' shareholders manage
Hoïle jointly and, while the governance procedures have not always been formal, they
agree on major decisions such as the implementation of Hotfile's amliate program.
(Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Fitov Dep.) at 597:1 1-598:22 (DE 324) (stating that i'major issues'
were put to a vote but were not opposedl.) Additionaly, Titov acknowledged that he
received power of attorney to act on behalf of the corporation 'as a manager of the
company when gsuch) acts are authorized by other shareholders.' (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1
(Titov Dep.) at 79.23-80:1., 82:5-12 (DE 288-1 (filed under seal; DE 324-2).)
Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Titov does not have the authority to make
unilateral decisions regarding im portant aspects of Hothle's business or operations.
Titov asserts that he was not the originator of certain concepts; for instance, he credits
with making the decision to implement the afiliate program . And Titov denies
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involvement in other aspects crucial to Hotfile's business, such as soliciting new
investors, selecting contractors or devising advertising strategies.
The evidence also shows that, in October 2009, Titov formed a company caled
Lem uria Communications Inc.j a Florida corporation that Hotfile uses to perform web
hosting. software maintenance and development. Titov, according to the Defendants, is
'the sole owner, manager, and director' of Lemuria.'o Lemuria
, 
in turn, contracts with
to perform som e of those services and pays for many of Hotfile's expenses.
(Yeh. Decl, Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 38:7-40:10, 106:2-107:14 (DE 288-1 (filed under seall',
DE 324-2),)
Beyond exam ining Titov's overall responsibilities at Hotfile, the Studios point to
several specific ways that Titov is Iinked to the infringement at issue. W ith respect to
the affiliate program , which the Studios believe promotes infringement, it is undisputed
that Titov provided input on technological feasibility. Moreover, Hotfile has failed to
rebut the Studios' issèrtions that Titov paid affiliates from an account he opened and
transferred to Hotfile Ltd., a company that handles most of Hotfile's finances and that Ine
manages. (Titov Repiy Decl. !! 4 (DE 378-1 (filed under seal; Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov
Dep.) at 602:9-14 (DE 324-2) (?Yes, there were instandes where users were paid by an
account opened (in) my name.').) Titov ajso statèd that he was aware of the master file
policy, acknowledging that it permitted users to continue to access suspected files even
10 Lemuria was formed one month after Hotfile's previous lnternet servioe provider
informed the company that it had received a large number of infringement
complaints from copyright holders and two months after a copyright holder
served a subpoena on that lnternet service provider. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov
Dep.) at 1 19:13-121(DE 288-2 (filed under seall; DE 324-2).) The Studios
contend that Lem uria was formed to prevent the consequences of a third-party
Internet service provider cutting off Hotfile's service and that Lemuria acts as a
front for Hotfile's com mercial activity, Hotfile denies these aliegations.
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while individual links were disabled. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (TitovDep.) at 602:16-604:13
(DE 324-2).) Similarly, given thatHotfile was governed jointly, Titov did not recal
opposing Hotfile's key policies, such as how it treated repeat infringers or how it
endeavored to remove infringing files.
Finaly, while evidence of Titov's personal involvement in Hotfile's treatment of
copyright infringement claims is not extensive, he acknowledged instructing Hotfile
employees to ban a user and to $'(b)e more strict in stopping these days,' after Hotfile
was sued by a company caled Perfect 10. (Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Titov Dep.) at 31 7:15-
321:10 (DE 288-2 (filed under seal; DE 324-2).) Titov was also responsible for hiring
Hotfile's DMCA agent,but he claims that others are responsible for responding to
DMCA notices and handling that aspect of Hoiile's operation.
F. Facts Relevant to Hotfile's Counterclaim
Separately, W arner moves for summary judgment
filed by Hotfile relating to 890 DMCA takedown notices that W arner submitted to Hotfile.
(DE 161-4.) In these notices, W arner typicaly stated 'under penalty of perjury' that it
on a l7-page counterclaim
was 'the owner or authorized Iegal representative of the owner of copyrights' and that it
had $'a good faith belief that use of this material is not authorized by the copyright
owner, the copyright owner's agent, or the Iaw.' Since April 2009, W arner has
padicipated in Hotfile's SRA program , in which the padies agree that deletions have the
same legal effect as takedown notices.
The counterclaim asseds that the works at issue were mistakenly identified as
infringing and that W arner violated 17 U.S.C. j 51249 by making such knowing and
material misrepresentations and causing injury to Hotfile. W arner contends that, while
28
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mistakes were made, they were not made knowingly and are not the type of egregious
violations contemplated by the statute', that there were few resulting damages to Hotfile;
and that Hotfile's motive in pursuing the claim is to demonstrate how dificult it can be
for anyone to identify and prevent infringement, which helps Hotfile ilustrate its defense
to the m ain infringement claims.
W arner's Review Process
Many of Hotfile's contentions concern the sufficiency of the review process
W arner im plemented to identify and notice particular files. As explained by W arner's
head of anti-piracy operations, David Kaplan, W arner devotes the effods of
employees to online anti-piracy enforcement, hires third-pady vendors, and, notably,
ln the automated review process, W arner's employees first determine that a sîte
is used for Internet piracy. (Kaplan Decl, !1 6 (DE 301-6).)
(ld. !( 8.)
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For each Iink
determined to contain infringing content, W arner sends infringement notices.
2. Prevalence and Knowledge of Errors
Overal, while the evidence shows that W arner's system has many commendable
characteristics, it also reveals som e areas for improvement. On one hand, W arner
applies the system only to sites it believes to be devoted to infringing content, takes
care in uses employees to tailor search terms,
reviews its1
b is conducts spot checks, 'practices on a continuous as 
,
(Kaplan Decl. 111 15-16 (DE 301-6).)
W arner contends that it 'lhas designed its system to err on the side of consewatism ,
even if that results in fewer infringing files being identifiedv in order to avoid errorsy' and
professes great confidence in the reliability of its enforcement. (Id. !( 6.) lt also
repeatedly asseds that its methodology and system features are common in its industry.
On the other hand, W arner readily adm its that mistakes do occur, and Hotfile has
identised characteristics that may be responsible for engendering those mistakes. For
example, W arner's staff did not download or review any Hotfile content before marking it
30
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11for removal. (Thompson Decl, Ex. 4 (Kaplan Dep.) at 43:12-44:14 (DE 354-5).)
Indeed, its search process
before issuing a takedown notice.
determ ination whether there were legal uses
for the files.
The parties have proffered Iim ited statistical and anecdotal evidence about how
this translates to the effectiveness of W arner's system
. For its part, W arner avers that it
sent 400,000 takedown notices to Hotfile prior to this Iawsuit without receiving any
counternotices from Hotfile or its users, suggesting that the m istakes were not apparent
or significant enough to contest. (See Kaplan Decl. :1 14 (DE 301-6).) Moreover,
according to W arner, the fact that only 89O erroneous files have been identified by
Hotile after it undertook the most scrupulous review of those takedown notices
suggests a Iow error rate, wel under one percent, by a simple calculation
.
W arner goes fudher, suggesting that the actual number of mistaken notices sent
to Hotfile numbers around 600, not 890. Showing the difficulty attendant to identifying
infringing content, the evidence shows that 19 of the files chalenged by Hotfile in tbe
counterclaim are in fact owned by W arner. Another 271 of the files undisputedly belong
to an entity, Electronic Ads, Inc., that gave W arner permission - albeit
, apparently after-
the-fact - to request removal of the files. (See Hopkins Decl. $ 9 (DE 301-7) (Electronic
11 W  er contends that it would not have been 'practicable for W arner to downloadarn
files prior to issuing a notification of infringement' because of the computing
resources required. (Kaplan Decl. !J 17 (DE 301-6).) Additionally, some of the
5les in the counterclaim were reviewed by a W arner vendor caled LeaklD! which
. (/d. $ 20.)
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Arts, lnc. executive stating that the company Kretroactively authorizes W amer having
sent takedown notices' on its behalg.) And it is also undisputed that of the 890 files
Iisted, 24 are duplicative. This fudher suppods the view that W arner's actual error rate,
in general and with respect to its search of Hotfile's website in particular, is smal.
In response, Hotfile points to other evidence that W arner's error rate may actually
be higher, the most impodant being an internal discussion between W arner employees
in August 201 1 .
Thus, drawing
inferences in favor of Hotfile, W arner employees m ight have known of an erroi rate as
high a during the time that it was identifying the fiies identified in the
counterclaim .
Hotfile also points to instances of anecdotal errors to show how unsound
W arner's search practices m ight have been. For exam ple,
(Thompson Decl. Ex. 4 (Kaplan Dep.)
at 16:10-17:4 (DE 354-5).) Warner also apparently
(Thompson Decl. EX. 5 (DE 304-1 t5led under
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seall; DE 354-6).) A search for th
(Thompson Decl. Ex. 16
(DE 304-6 (filed under seal); DE 354-17).) And
(Thompson Decl. Ex. 18 (DE 304-6 (filed under seal; DE 354-19).)
Moreover, W arner admits that on Iinking sites, it
(Thompson Decl. Ex. 4 (Kaplan Dep,) at
232:23-233:7 (DE 304-1 (filed under seal; DE 354-5).) Thus, it deleted one of the
counterclaim files because it
Hotfile claims that en masse deletion was W arner's typical
practice and extends beyond this example.
In addition, Hotfile has also proffered evidence of an ilicit motive on W al-ner's
part. For exam ple, W arner liberaly removed what is by aI indications a popuiar aI3d
innocuous free software program mentioned at the outset of this decision, JDownioader,
which was created by a company caled 'Appwork GmbH' and which W arner does not
own or have rights to. ln one instance, W arner targeted the program because it
(Thompson Decl. Ex, 4 (Kaplan Dep.) at 225:13-226:12 (DE 304-1 (filed
under seal; DE 354-5).)
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W arner's efforts to police were at times overzealous and overreaching. ln the
case of JDownloader, its anti-piracy executive stated that
As discussed
above, W arner took Iiberties in removing content owned by Other copyright holders,
SUCh as Electronic Ads, only obtaining permission to do so later in an 'antipiracy
partnership.' ln the main summary judgment briefing, the Studios show that the most
popular content on Hotfile is actually software that is ilegal to distribute but that does
nOt include the Studios' works. And, in its motion, W arner points out that Hotfile is
unable to recover for the vast majority of the files Warner wrongfuly removed. These
facts demonstrate that W arner's goals may have been broader than preventing
infringement of its own works in the manner prescribed by Section 512(c).
Evidence of Dam ages
Assum ing W arner's actions were unauthorized, W arner contends that Hotfile is
unable to show a cognizable injury from the takedown notices identified in the
counterclaim. First, W arner has established that many of the files did not cause Hotfile
to wrongfully terminate any paying users. At least 28 of the files were noticed before
Hotfile im plemented a repeat infringer policy based on strikes, meaning that Hotfile took
no action when it received those notices. Sim ilarly, nine fies wrongfully noticed after
34
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Hotfile implemented its three-strikes policy in February 201 1 did not result in user
term ination, since those useo never accumulated more than three strikes. Additionally,
53 files were posted by users who wouid have accumulated three or more strikes
without counting the fipes from the counterclaim , although Hoiile questions whether
some of those notifications were DMcA-compliant. And finally, nine remaining files
correspond to six users, none of whom was a subscribing mem ber. These facts are not
otherwise subject to dispute.
W arner has also retained an expert, Dr. Zebrak, who concluded that 477 of the
files - if they did not belong to W arner - 'highly Iikely' infringed others' copyrights and
had no business being on Hotfile's system. This portion of Dr. Zebrak's testimony is
chalenged by Hotfile, which points out that the expert acknowledged he did not contact
those owners to find out whether distribution on Hotfile was truly unauthorized. (Zebrak
Decl. li 16 (DE 201-1)*, Thompson Decl. Ex. 32 (Zebrak Dep.) at 319:3-22 (DE 354-33).)
It is wel-established that a lack of authorization is reguired to prove a claim of copyright
infringement. See Morley Music Co. v. Cafe Conth lnc., 777 F. Supp. 1579, 1582 (S.D.
Fla. 1991) (citations omitted). There is no compeling evidence one way or the other
establishing these files' copyright status.
But Hotfile's main assedion is that W arner's focus wrongly assumes that Hotfile's
Iost revenue could only have com e from term inated users' subscription fees. Instead,
Hotfile points out that its business model is driven by the availability of content, whiah
W arner's actions have interfered with. Hotfile has provided evidence that the files in the
counterclaim, even excluding the files identified as infringing by Dr. Zebrak, were
downloaded 278,319 tim es and earned Hotfile in prem ium subscriptions from 51
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new user accounts. (Titov Decl. 15 7-8 (DE 304-10 (filed under seal; DE 352-1).) The
JDownloader program in particular was deleted eight times by W arner, but had been
downloaded a total of 150,028 times and resulted in 42 prem ium subscriptions, earning
for Hotfile. (Titov Decl. IIT 7-8 (DE 304-10 (5Ied under seal; DE 352-1).) And,
W arner's own exped acknowledged that the false notices caused one JDownloader
distributor to be briefly suspended, apparently preventing downloads of his files for two
days. It is unclear whether the files deleted were ever replaced. (Foster Reply Decl. f! 3
(DE 360-1 (filed under seal; DE 409-9).)
Hofile's exped, Dr, Matthew R, Lynde, estimates that Hoiile's total damages
range from . (Thompson Decl. Ex. 34 (Lynde DecI.) at % 9 (DE 304-7
(filed under seal; DE 354-35)', Yeh. Decl. Ex. 1 (Lynde Dep.) at 282:5-25 (DE 301-10).)
He opines on a variety of ways in which Hotfile could have been harmed, including
diminishing payments to affiliates, decreasing incentive for users to pay for prem iblm
access, and harm to Hotfile's business reputation and goodwil. His opinion associatas
an observed decrease in revenue with increased use of takedowns by W arner.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties have moved for summary judgment on various aspects of the claims
and defenses raised in this Iitigation. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56,
summary judgment is appropriate if, after discovery, 'the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, asidavits and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of Iaw.'
(1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrelt 477 U.S. 317, 322
'An issue of fact is 'm aterial' if, under the
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applicable substantive law, it m ight affect the outcome of the case.'
Crossarm Co., lnc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (1 1th Cir. 2004)
Hickson Corp. v. N.
(citations omited). 'An
issue of fact is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could Iead a rational trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving pady.' Id. at 1260 (citations omited). S'The moving pady
bears the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a triable fact issue.' Cont'l
Cas. Co. kt Wendt, 2O5 F.3d 1258, 1261(1 1th Cir. 2000) (citing Ce/olex Corp. , 477 U.S.
at 317). ln ruling on summary judgment, the evidence and reasonable inferences are
construed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Adickes g. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970),' Jackson v. Belsouth Telecomms., 372 F,3d 1250, 1280
(1 1th Cir. 2004).
lf the movant establishes the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the
nonmoving pady must 'go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits or by the
ldepositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file' designate 'specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trialv' Ce/olex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Thus, 'liqf the non-movant . . . fails to adduce evidence which would
be sufficient . . . to suppod a jury finding for the non-movant, summary judgment may be
granted.' Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of FIa., Inc., 1 16 F.3d 1364, 1370 (1 1th
Cir. 1997) (citation omited). However, 'if factual issues are present, the Coud must
deny the motion and proceed to triala' W arrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. MN  Nan
Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (1 1th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted).
A. DMCA Defense
The padies agree that the proper stading point for the Coud's analysis is whether
Hotfile is entitled to DMCA protection, given its ability to absolve Hotfile of Iiability for
37
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secondary copyright infringement. See 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(1) (stating that if the safe
harbor requirements are met, 'Ea) service provider shal not be Iiable for monetary relief,
or, except as provided in subsection (), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material
that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service
provider.'l', S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) at 64, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 639
(stating that the safe harbor 'protectls) qualifying service providers from liability for al
monetary relief for direct, vicarious and contributory infringement' as wel as injunctive
relieg. As recounted in detail in Viacom, Congress enacted the DMCA in 1998 to
provide Iiability safe harbors for service providers that operate or control networks
through which users store copyrighted digital works if those providers meet cedain
specified criteria. 676 F.3d at 26-27 (citing 17 U.S.C. j 512(a)-(d) and Iegislative
history). The Studios contend that Hotfile is not entitled to safe harbor protection as a
matter of law, while Hotfile asks for a determination that it is not Iiable for acts of
infringement that took place after the filing of the Complaint on February 18, 201 1 .
Generally, the advances of the lnternet and digital technology make possible
replication and dissemination of creative works on an astonishing scale. S. Rep. No.
105-190 (1998) at 8 (noting dsthe ease with which digital works can be copied and
distributed worldwide vidualy instantaneously'). In that regard, the DMCA was meant
to foster the growth of the Internet while protecting the rights of copyright holders and
encouraging Internet entities' effods to offer valuable on-line services, which on
occasion might be infringing under copyright law. Id.; Realnetworks, Inc. B. DVD Copy
Control Ass'n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ('tThe DMCA represents
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Congress' attem pt at a balance to preserve ownership rights protection for companies
and adists in the face of the modern reality of a digital worid with an increasingly
technologically-savvy population.'). As Hotfile recognized at oral argument, without the
im munity conferred by the DMCA safe harbor provisions, Internet businesses could
otherwise be subject to ruinous Iiability under common Iaw principles of secondary
infringement.
A pady asseding DMCA'S safe harbor as an affirmative defense to a claim of
copyright infringement has the burden
See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Remaro Communities., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001)
(stating that entitlement to immunity under the DMCA is not 'presumptive' but applies to
service providers that prove they meet cedain criterial; see a/so Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913 F.2d 1544, 1552 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (discussing burden of
proof as to a statute of Iimitations defense). Nonetheless, in many instances, the DMCA
serves to relieve service providers of burdens they might otherwise shoulder, even
transferring them to the copyright owner. See, e.g., UM G Records, Inc. Shelter
of demonstrating entitlement to its protections.
Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2013) ('congress made a considered
policy determination that the 'DMCA notification procedures (would) place the burden of
policing copyright infringement -  identifying the potentialy infringing material and
adequately documenting infringement -  squarely on the owners of the copyright.''
(quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI LLC, 488 F.3d 1 102, 1 1 13 (9th Cir. 2007))). In this
regard, couds have counseled that the advantages of the DMCA should be viewed
capaciously. See Flava Works v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2012). Although
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an affirmative defense, the DMCA has often been construed in favor of service
providers, requiring relatively Iittle effort by their operations to maintain imm unity.
Hotfile asseds that it qualifies for DMCA protection as an Internet service
provider that alows information to reside on its system at the direction of its users,
which is one of four specified categories recognized by the Act. See 17 U.S.C. j
512(c)(1). The padies do not dispute that Hotfile qualifies as a service provider. See id.
j 512(k)(1)(A) (defining a t'service provider' as 'an entity offering the transmission,
routing, or providing of connections for digital online communications, between or
among points specified by a user, of material of the user's choosing, without
modification to the content of the material as sent or received.').The term 'storage' has
also been broadly interpreted to include displaying or disseminating content that is
uploaded to the system's servers at the direction of users, which covers Hotfile's
operations. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 62O Supp. 2d at 1089-91 (construing
statutory Ianguage and concluding that Congress intended a broad application by
including the phrase ldby reason of,' such that the protected infringing conduct need not
be limited to an act of storage).
Section 512 provides that a preliminary condition for eligibility is that the service
provider maintain a policy to terminate drepeat infringers.' 17 U.S.C. j 512(i)(1)(A).
The padicular category of service provider that applies to Hotfile imposes four additional
requirements'. the service provider designates an
Copyright Office and to the public through its service',
agent to the United States
(2) the service provider acts
expeditiously to l'remove, or disable access to' infringing material it actually knows of or
of which it should be aware from 'facts or circumstances' showing that 'infringing
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activity is apparenti' (3) the provider has no actual or red flag knowledge of infringing
activity; and (4) the provider receives no financial benefit from infringing activity. ld. j
512(c)(1). W hile case law has developed in other pads of the country, construing these
provisions is an issue of first impression in this Circuit.
1. Repeat Infringer Policy
The repeat infringer requirement of Section 512(i) cals for a policy, reasonably
implemented, that provides for the termination of a service provider's users in
dsappropriate circumstances''
The Iimitations on Iiability established by this section shall apply to a
service provider only if the service provider . . has adopted and
reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of
the service provider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the
termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account
holders of the service provider's system or network who are repeat
infringers.
17 U.S.C. j 512(i)(1)(A). Congress,in enacting the DMCA, failed to elaborate upon
what it means for a policy to be reasonably implemented.See Perfect 10, Inc. v. ç)CBiI,
LLC, 488 F.3d 1 102, 1 109 (9th Cir. 2007).Thus, in the absence of express statutory
Ianguage, the Ninth Circuit has prescribed that d'an implementation is reasonable if,
under 'appropriate circumstances,' the service provider term inates users who
repeatedly or blatantly infringe copyright' - a standard that this Coud applies. CCBiI,
LLC, 488 F.3d at 1 1O9 (quoting Iegislative history).
Such a policy may take a variety of forms. Id. Notably, $'j 512(i) does not require
a service provider to decide, ex ante, the specific types of conduct that wil merit
restricting access to its services.' Corbis Corp. B. Amazon.com, Inc. , 351 F. Supp. 2d
1090, 1 101-02 (W .D. W ash. 2004), rev'd in parl on other grounds, Cosmetic Ideas, Inc.
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B, IAc/lnterativecorp., 606 F.3d 612 (9th Cir. 201 0).For storage Iockers Iike Hotfile, the
focus of the analysis is on uploading users: 'users who know they Iack authorization
and nevedheless upload content to the Internet for the world to experience or copy .
are blatant infringers that Internet service providers are obligated to ban from their
websites.' Capitol Records, Inc. B. Mp3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 627, 637 (S.D.N.Y.
20 1 1 ) .
In assessing the reasonableness of a defendant's effods, additional guidance on
what constitutes an appropriate policy can be ascedained in the Act's Iegislative history.
For instance, policies should be considered in Iight of Congress's intention that lsthose
who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for the
intellectual property rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing
that access.' UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks; Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099,
1 1 18 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting legislative history). Service providers granting access to
those users should also be given d'strong incentives . . . to prevent their services from
becoming safe havens or conduits for known repeat copyright infringersx' Pelfect 10,
Inc. v'. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1 146, 1 178 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Yet
consonant with other provisions of the DMCA, couds should not construe policies so as
to impose alirmative action on the pad of the service provider to monitor for
infringement. See 17 U.S.C. j 512(m),' Cybernet Venturest lnc. ,2 13 F. Supp. 2d at
1 176 (interpreting legislative history). As Congress stated:
The Com mittee recognizes that there are different degrees of on-line
copyright infringement, from the inadvedent and noncommercial, to the
willful and commercial. In addition, the Committee does not intend this
provision to undermine the principles of new subsection ((m)) or the
knowledge standard of new subsection (c) by suggesting that a provider
must investigate possible infringements, monitor its service, or m ake
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dimcult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not infringing. However,
those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet
through disrespect for the intelectual propedy rights of others should
know that there is a realistic threat of Iosing that access.
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(1) at 61 (1998) (emphasis added).
The Studios in this action do not contend that Hotfile failed to dictate or publish
any policy, but rather that Hotfile failed to reasonably implement it by actualy
terminating users. Several considerations, taken together, Iead the Coud to agree.
Initially, a reasonable policy must be capable of tracking infringers. Reviewing the
holdings of Elison t Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004) and In re Aimster
Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cerl. denied, 540 U.S. 1 107 (2004),
the coud in CCBiI announced a standard for Section 512(i) in which a service provider
must maintain a vehicle to receive notices of potential infringement, design its system
so as to be able to ascedain the identity of the users responsible for those files, and
12 W ithout thosemake some effod to record infringing users
. 488 F.3d at 1 1 10.
threshold functions, service providers are unable to carry out any sod of reasonable
policy. For instance, in In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634 (N D. 11.
2002), the district coud concluded that whatever policy the defendants might have
ostensibly had could not be reasonably implemented because the system's encryption
12 This is different from a situation where a plaintiff claims that a service provider
must Iook for repeat infringers who open accounts under new pseudonyms. CL
Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1 1 32, 1 144-45
(distinguishing A&M Records, Inc. v'. Napsterj Inc., No. C99-05183 MHP, 2000
W L 573136 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000), which found that failure to block users'
Internet Protocol addresses created a question whether the policy was
reasonable). In CCBiI, there was no dispute that the defendant implemented a
policy by which it kept a DMCA Iog indicating the name and e-mail address of the
webmaster for each site to which it provided service.
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of user information made it 'impossible to ascedain which users are transferring which
files.' Id. at 659. The coud ruled that the precondition to safe harbor was not met even
though the plaintiffs had failed to identify 1'a single repeat infringer whose access should
be terminated.' Id.
In this case, while the statute does not require Hotfile to maintain a perfect policy
(or even anything as stringent as the three-strikes policy it eventualy implemented), it is
apparent that Hotfile effectively did nothing to tie notices to repeat infringers. Titov
adm itted, and Hotfile does not seriously dispute, that the corporation had no way to
keep track of infringing users based on infringement notices. Hotfile's sole method for
terminating its users was its d'discretion,' which it evidently failed to exercise', it had no
technology to record notices and no procedure for dealing with notification.
Consequently, it is not too harsh an assessment to conclude that when Hotfile received
such notices, it was Hotfile's practice to ignore them rather than act to terminate the
users they were associated with.This deliberate disregard is significant.
The data discussed above - both the number of users who received m ultiple
notices of infringement and the number of users who were term inated after Hotfile
im plemented a stronger policy - show that Hotfile failed to act when confronted with
13 Thus despite receiving over eight milion notices for five milioninfringing conduct
. ,
users, Hotfile only terminated 43 users before the commencement of this action, for
reasons that had no apparent relation to the notices Hotfile received. Most glaringly,
there were 61 users who had accumulated more than 300 notices each. As recounted
13 Hotfile claims that it 'had no knowledge that the filelsl-in-suit were infringing aparf
from notifications Hotfile (might) have received from the Studios regarding these
aleged infringements.' (Titov Decl. !1 6. (DE 321-1) (emphasis addedl.)
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above, those users were padicularly prolific, driving traffic to Hotfile's website, receiving
money through Hotfile's affiliate program, and generating significant revenue for Hotfile
by encouraging users to conved to premium subscriptions,
In response, Hotfile contends that the DMCA does not mandate action based on
infringement notices. On this point, there is some disagreement as to whether such
i te to knowledge of a user's actual infringementvl4notces equa See
, 
genera//y, 4-128 M;
Nimmer & Nimmer, Copyright j 12B.1O(B) (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2013). The coud
in Corbis Corp., for instance, found that DMCA notices alone are not enough to confer
knowledge on a service provider: 'Although there may be instances in which two or
more DM CA com pliant notices m ake a service provider aware of a user's blatant, repeat
infringement, the notices alone do not make the user's activity blatant, or even
conclusively determine that the user is an infringer.' 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1 105 & n.9; see
also Mp3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 637.
Yet a subsequent circuit coud decision in CCBiII suggests a different approach
deficient notices of infringement - inon this issue
. 
That coud held that statutorily
padicular, those lacking a declaration from the copyright holder detailing ownership and
the material's infringing nature - were an insufficient basis for terminating a user.
CCBiI, 488 F.3d at 1 1 13. At the same time, however, it held that the district coud erred
in failing to consider whether defendants' continued services for websites that were the
subject of non-pady notifications (which might have conformed with the statute)
14 couds agree that Section 512(i) requires terminating known repeat infringers.
See CC Bil, 488 F.3d at 1 113 ('A policy is unreasonable only if the service
provider failed to respond when it had knowledge of the infringement.'l; Elison,
357 F.3d at 1080.
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constituted an unreasonable policy. Id. Thus, the decision suggests that proper
notifications, which require '(a! statement that the complaining party has a good faith
belief that use of the material in the m anner complained of is not authorized by the
copyright owner, its agent, or the Iaw,' 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(3)(A)(v), can provide requisite
knowledge to defendants. Other decisions support this reasoning. See UMG
Recordings, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1 1 16-18 (holding that filtering technology used by
the defendant to identify infringing material did not constitute knowledge because,
ldhowever beneficial the (filtering) technology is in helping to identify infringing material, it
does not meet the standard of reliability and verifiability required by (CC Bilj in order to
justify terminating a user's accountnl; Flava Works, Inc.v. Gunfer, No. 10C6517, 2011
W L 3205399, at *10 (N.D. 11. July 27, 201 1), rev'd on other grounds, 689 F.3d 754 (7th
Cir. 2012) (d'It is true that service providers are not required to police their sites for
infringement, but they are required to investigate and respond to notices of infringement
-  with respect to content and repeat infringers.'). As one coud observed, CC Bil
borrowed the knowledge standard from Section 512(c)(1)(A), which requires removal of
material upon notification of claimed infringement.
at 1 1 17., see also Corbis Corp., 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1 1O7 ('(T)he most poweKul evidence
of a service provider's knowledge (is an) actual notice of infringement from the copyright
holder.'l; cfk UMG Recordings, Inc., 2013 W L 1092793, at *10 (stating that the plaintiff's
UM G Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d
'decision to forgo the DMCA notice protocol stripped it of the most powerful evidence of
a service provider's knowledge - actual notice of infringement' (quotation omitedl).
Aside from infringement notices, however, Hoiile had no alternative method for
preventing repeat infringement by its users. Couds often consider the degree of
46
Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW   Document 534   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013   Page 46 of 99
infringement at issue and the defendant's efforts to stop repeat infringers in determining
the reasonableness of the policy's implementation. In Corbis Corp., for instance, the
defendant had cancelled milions of offending merchant Iistings, warned such vendors
that ltrepeated violations of the rules may result in dpermanent suspension,'' and
ultimately terminated hundreds of vendors.351 F. Supp. 2d at 1 103-05 & n.7. This
evidence was sufficient to show that the defendant had meaningfuly responded to
allegations of copyright infringement and thus, 'properly implemented a procedure for
addressing copyright complaints and enforcing violations of its policies.' Id. at 1 103.
Moreover, the plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant S'could have used another,
more effective and reasonable' method for preventing terminated users from re-
accessing the service. Id. at 1 103-04. Finally, addressing the l'appropriate
circumstances' Ianguage of the statute, the court concluded that there was insufficient
evidence that the defendant had knowledge of blatant infringement - such as user
statements about the pirated nature of a product, chat room discussions regarding use
of the service for infringing purposes, or characteristics of listings that would give away
their infringing nature - that would have required it to terminate user access. Id. at
1 104-05. Thus, the defendant was entitled to safe harbor protection.
By contrast, the district coud in In re Aimster confronted a policy similar to the
one at issue here that warned users not to post infringing content and promised to
terminate users who repeatedly violated copyright law. The coud discounted the policy
as an labsolute mirage' after evidence showed that the defendants obstructed ways of
determ ining which users were transferring infringing files and, in practice, failed to
terminate a single user.In re Aimster, 252 F. Supp. 2d at 658-59 & n. 18 (declining safe
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harbor protection on motion for preliminary injunction). Affirming the district coud on
appeal, the Seventh Circuitinstructed that a 'service provider m ust do what it can
reasonably be asked to do to prevent the use of its services by drepeat infringers.'' /d.
at 655 (citation omited). In a similar vein, other couds have held that lùwhere a service
provider is given sufficient evidence to create actual knowledge of blatant, repeat
infringement by padicular users, padicularly infringement of a willful and commercial
naturej' it is compelled to act. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1 176 (citing
legislative history). Stil others have held that there are circumstances in which
operators must go beyond merely posting a policy in a site's terms of use, as Hotfile did.
See Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc. ,633 F. Supp. 2d 124, 1 31 (S.D.N.Y.
152009).
Here, the scale of activity - the
copyright holders - indicated to Hotfile that a substantial number of blatant repeat
infringers made the system a conduit for infringing activity. Yet Hoiile did not act on
receipt of DMCA notices and failed to devise any actual policy of dealing with those
olenders, even if it publicly asseded otherwise.
notices of infringement and complaints from
lt has presented no evidence to show
15 The Coud also notes that most of the 'robust' steps Hotfile claimsto have taken
to prevent repeat infringement relate to its handling of padicular files and not their
users. Hotfile's SRA program is legaly insufficient because, by its plain
Ianguage, Section 512(i) requires user termination, thereby targeting future
infringement from an individual who is deemed Iikely to recidivate. See Cybernet
Ventures; Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1 176 ('tlslection 512(i) is focused on infringing
users, whereas 512(c) is focused primarily on the infringing material itself.').
More padicularly, while Section 512(c) requires service providers to remove
infringing material, Section 512(i) targets the source of that infringement. See id.
('Making the entrance into the safe harbor too wide would allow service providers
acting in complicity with infringers to approach copyright infringement on an
image by image basis without ever targeting the source of these images.'
(citation omittedl).
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that the smal number of removals that did occur were for any reason other than
threatened Iitigation or by coud order. lndeed, it has been unable to point to a single
specific user who was term inated pursuant to its policy of manual review and exercise
of 'discretion.' Documents and statistics indicate that there was never any realistic
threat of termination to Hotfile's users, whose activities were protected by the
com pany's indifference to infringement notices. In sum , regardless of official policies
forbidding infringement, Hotfile did not significantly address the problem of repeat
infringers. This renders Hotfile's policy legaly insufficient under Section 512(i).
Before Ieaving the issues the Court briefly addresses two other points made by
Hotfile. First, Hotfile contends that the Studios should be equitably estopped from
asserting a DMCA challenge because of the parties' previous cooperation on
infringement issues. ln particular, they assert that W arner's participation in Hofile's
SRA program precludes the Studios' DMCA argument (although it should be noted that
not every Studio Plaintiff padicipated in the SRA program,)
(Titov Decl. Ex. 31 (DE 275-10 (filed
under seall; DE 321-31 ; DE 321-32) DE 32 1-33).) That individual later testified,
however, that he was merely 'being poite' and did not condone Hosile's actions.
Principles of estoppel appjy to copyright actions in the same manner as they
apply to other actions at iaw. Although the parties have not cited authority discussing a
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DMCA defense in padicular, a copyright claim can be waived if '.41) the plaintiff Iknowsl
the facts of the defendant's infringing conduct; (2) the plaintiff Iintends) that its conduct
shall be acted on or must so act that the defendant has a right to believe that it is so
intended', (3) the defendant (is! ignorant of the true facts; and (4) the defendant (reliesj
on the plaintiff's conduct to its injury.' Carson v. Dynegy, Inc. ,344 F.3d 446, 453 (5th
Cir. 2003) (colecting authority). Here, although Hotfile has pointed to an isolated
discussion that may be useful in a cross-examination at trial, there are no facts to
sustain a conclusion that the Studios have acquiesced to Hotfile's conduct. The Studios
appear to have protected the rights to their content, and there is no suggestion that they
knew and approved of the extent of Hotfile's actions (or inaction).
Second, Hotfile has moved for padial summary judgment on the applicability of
the DMCA to conduct that occurred after this Iitigation was initiated. As suppod, Hotfile
provides evidence of a continuum of increased compliance, such as applying new
fingerprinting and hashing technology, giving copyright owners access to Hotfile's SRA
program , and implementing other Idpowerful countermeasures,' spanning from the
summer of 2009 through Hotfile's retooling of its affiliate program in February 2012, a
year after this Iitigation began.
meaningful, recent steps to combat infringement. For example, it is undisputed that
Some of this evidence shows that Hotfile took
Hotfile adopted and began to implement a three-strikes policy, resulting in the
termination of over 20,000 of its users after the stad of this litigation.Although the Court
is mindful that the DMCA does not specify the characteristics of a reasonably
implemented policy, itis unaware of any situation in which a three-strikes polic'y has
been found to be ineffective. See, e.g., Viacom Int'l Inc.v. YouTube, Inc. , 71 8 F. Supp.
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2d 514, 528-29 (S.D.N.Y.2010) rev'd in pa# on other grounds, 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir.
2012) (discussing strike-based policies).
This request to Iimit Iiability raises questions of whether a pady can ever regain
the protections of the DMCA and whether the Coud should trust Hotfile not to reved to
their offending conduct', whether the Coud can determine the exact point at which
Hotfile implemented a DMcA-compliant policy and, if so, whether the Coud should use
the date of technical compliance as the point of entry to safe harbor or whether the
proper measure should be when Hotfile ceased to be a hotbed for infringement (since
many DMCA requirements have a prospective purposel; and whether the parties have
conducted a sufficient amount of discovery for the Coud to make these determinations
at this stage. However, in their briefing and at a day-long oral argument, the Studios
made clear that they have brought suit based on Hotfile's system and business model
'as they existed pre-complaint' and that post-complaint damages are not a part of this
dispute. Accordingly, relying on these express representations and because the
Studios have not yet made any claim concerning post-complaint damage, the Coud
need not decide these issues and refrains from issuing an advisory opinion on Hotfile's
current practices.
2. Other Disqualifying Factors
Having concluded that a necessary precondition to DMCA safe harbor eligibility -
a reasonably implemented repeat infringer policy - is Iacking as a matter of Iaw, the
Coud concludes that Hotfile's DMCA defense fails. Nevedheless, the Court offers
observations and conclusions about two of the remaining DMCA requirements.
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a. DMCA Agent
Section 512(c)(2) requires that a service provider 'designatel ) an agent to
receive notifications of claimed infringement . . . by making available through its service,
including on its website in a Iocation accessible to the public, and by providing to the
Copyright Office, substantialy the folowing information: (A) the name, address, phone
number, and electronic mailaddress of the agent.' 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(2). Per the
express terms of the statute, 'tlojnly substantial compliance with the enumerated
requirements is required by subsection 512(c)(2),as is also the case with subsection
(c)(3).' Perfect 10, Inc. L'. Amazon.com, Inc., No. CV 05-4753 AHM (SHx), 2009 W L
1334364, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2009) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 105-551(11) (1998)). The
legislative history for the provision includes the following committee statement, which
explains that decision:
The Com mittee intends that the substantial compliance standard in
subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) be applied so that technical errors (such as
misspelling a name, supplying an outdated area code if the phone number
is accompanied by an accurate address, or supplying an outdated name if
accompanied by an e-mail address that remains valid for the successor of
the prior designated agent or agent of a copyright owner) do not disqualify
service providers and copyright owners from the protections afforded
under subsection (c). The Commitee expects that the parties wil comply
with the functional requirements of the notification provisions-such as
providing sumcient information so that a designated agent or the
complaining pafy submitting a notification m ay be contacted eKcjenf/y-in
order to ensure that the notification and take down procedures set fodh in
this subsection operate smoothly.
S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) (emphasis added). 1$To prevail at trial, the service provider
has the burden of proving that it properly designated a copyright agent and that it
responded to notifications as required.' Perfect 10, Inc., 2009 W L 1334364, at *8.
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Here, the record shows that Hotfile had a l'repod abuse' form on its website and
provided an e-mail address where users could repod infringing content. It did not
register a DMCA agent with the Copyright Office until December 2009., did not identify
an agent on its website until May 2010., and, to date, has not provided a proper mailing
address for its registered agent insofar as it Iists only a post office box. See 37 C.F.R. j
201.38(c) (noting that the submission of an agent designation must bear the caption
'tlnterim Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claimed Infringement' and
include, among other things, a Ssful address' and not a tdpost office box or similar
designation . . . except where it is the only address that can be used in that geographic
Iocation'). W hile the statute focuses on whether someone with an infringement
complaint would be able to contact the company, courts have held that substantial
compliance in the DMCA context 'means substantial compliance with aII its clauses, not
just some of them.' Perfect 10, Inc. V'. Yandex N. U., No. C 12-01521 W HA, 201 3 W L
1899851, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2013) (discussing 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(3)). Thus, even
were Hotfile otherwise able to avail itself of the DMCA safe harbor, the Court concludes
that it would be ineligible under Section 512(c)(2) at least through May 2010, the. date
on which it published its agent's contact information. See Yandex, 2013 W L 1899851,
at *7 ('The phrase dsubstantialy aII the folowing information' modifies the ensuing the
subparagraphs that list types of contact information . . . it cannot excuse a failure to
provide the Copyright Office with any information at aII.').
b. Actual or Red Flag Knowledge
of Infringem ent
Finaly, much of the Studios' briefing addresses Section 512(c)(1)(A)(i), which
requires that a defendant not have 'actualknowledge that the material or an activity
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using the material on the system or network is infringing' without removing it. 17 U.S.C.
j 512(c)(1)(A)(i). The safe harbor also requires that the defendant not have knowledge
'of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity is apparent.' 17 U.S.C. j
512(c)(1)(A)(i). As one court interpreting the statute explained, 'ltlhe DMCA'S
protection of an innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service
provider loses its innocence, i.e.,at the moment it becomes aware that a third pady is
using its system to infringe.' ALS Scan, Inc., 239 F.3d at 625. These provisions of the
DMCA are designed to 'deny safe harbor protection to Internet service providers
operating or linking to pirate sites whose illegal purpose is obvious to a reasonable
person.' Mp3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 643-44 (citing S. Rep. No. 105-190
( 1 998) .
Nevedheless, there are two impodant Iimitations
Section 512(m) specifies that a service provider has no duty to monitor activity occurring
on its service or to 'affirmatively seek facts indicating infringing activity,' which informs
the knowledge analysis. 17 U.S.C. j 512(m).
imposes the requirement that providers
Second, because the statute elsewhere
remove every piece of material identified as
on disqualification. First,
infringing, lslgleneral awareness of rampant infringement is not enough to disqualify a
service provider of protection.' Mp3tunes, LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 644. Instead, the
section dlrequires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity.' Viacom Inth
Inc., 676 F.3d at 30-32 (colecting authority) ('l(T)he nature of the removal obligation
itself contemplates knowledge or awareness of specific infringing material, because
expeditious removal is possible only if the service provider knows with padicularity
which items to remove.'l', accord UMG Records, Inc., 2013 W L 1 092793, at *1 1
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(declining to adopt 1a broad conception of the knowledge requirement' and holding that
the safe harbor requires dlspecific knowledge of padicular infringing activity').
Alternatively, d'the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was
subjectively aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement 'objectively'
obvious to a reasonable person.' Viacom Intj lnc., 676 F.3d at 31 (emphasis added).
Couds have recognized that while willful blindness under the common law - i.e., an
intentional effod to avoid guilty knowledge - can equate to actual knowledge, a DMCA
analysis should not Iose sight of the focus on specificity. Id. at 35 ('(W)ilfuI blindness ( )
may be applied, in appropriate circumstances, to demonstrate knowledge or awareness
of specific instances of infringement under the DMCA.')', Tifany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc.,
600 F.3d 93, 107, 109-10 (2d Cir. 2010). ln a recent decision analyzing the competing
considerations of the statute, one coud concluded that a lack-of-knowledge defense
was a triable issue because several documents in the record could have been viewed
dtas imposing a duty to make fudher inquiries into tspecific and identifiable' instances of
possible infringement.' Capitol Records, Inc. Mp3tunes, LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931
(W HP), 2013 W L 1987225, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2013) (citation omitted).
W ith regard to Hotfile's actual knowledge, the Studios' proof consists primarily of
circumstantial evidence of infringement. The Studios assed that Hotfile does not serve
a primarily lawful purpose, citing the facts that Hotfile pays users based on downloads
rather than uploads (suggesting that it is a file sharing, rather than storage, service) and
that a high percentage of downloaded files are infringing (suggesting infringing files are
the most popular and drive user activity). The Studios thus contend that Hotfile
resembles other peer-to-peer file sharing networks that have been shut down,
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highlighted by the fact that Hotfile's business increased as some of those systems
became inactive. As fudher suppod, the Studios cite documents containing purpoded
admissions that Hoiile is dlthe flagship of non-licensed content.'
ln response, Hotfile states that it provides a vehicle for the distribution of files
with the authorization of the content owner and that the primary purposes of its system
are personal storage, 'space shifting' and distribution of non-protected materials.
Indeed, Hotfile has shown thatone of the Studios used Hotfile to distribute its own
its network is actually used for
been downloaded (i.e,, most
content. And Hotfile points to statistics showing that
those purposes, observing that most files have never
uploaded files have not been retrieved by another userl', that the most popular Iinks
currently available are for noninfringing content (such as open-source software) that is
meant to be freely copied and shared', that there is no search feature that allows users
to locate files; and that only a smal percentage of files have been the subject of a
DMCA notice or SRA action or have been the subject of infringement. According to
Hotfile, it is a small business trying to eke out a reasonable profit in a prohibitively
Iitigious world.
Considering alI of the evidence, the Coud cannot say - and does not need to
determine - which Hotfile is before it. The testimony, documents and evidence of
particular system characteristics create an issue of fact for a jury as to whether Hotfile
knew or blinded itself to actual infringement of padicular works, on a smal or Iarge
scale. The master copy policy as it existed prior to this litigation, for instance, could
mean that Hotfile was attuned to the infringing nature of files, but merely disabled the
offending Iink rather than removing the file itself. Because a significant number of the
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DMCA notices concerned the Studios' works, a jury could conclude that Hotfile
understood that it was continuing to make padicular infringing content available to the
public or that, at the very Ieast, it should have investigated those files. Sim ilarly, to the
extent that communications with users should have aleded Hotfile to the infringing
nature of files on its system that were owned by the Studios (such as users seeking
technical assistance who indicated that their difficulties were owing to the ilegal nature
of their activity), Hotfile might be deemed to have possessed red flag knowledge. See
UMG Recordings, Inc., 2013 W L 1092793, at *14 (stating that had e-mails identifying
infringing content come from a system's users, rather than the copyright owner, 'it might
meet the red flag test because it specified padicular infringing material'). lndeed, based
on the evidence put on by the padies,
have understood that padicular material was infringing (or at Ieast should have Iooked
into whether infringement was occurring) when it became aware of the Iink name.
a jury might even determine that Hotfile should
But '$(a)s a general rule, a pady's state of mind (such as knowledge or intent) is a
question of fact for the factfinder, to be determ ined after trial.' Chanel, Inc. v. Italian
Activewear of FIa., Inc., 931 F.2d 1474, 1476 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Thus, as to actual ()r red
flag knowledge of infringement, the Coud concludes that a genuine issue of material
fact exists, and this issue would have to be resolved by a jury at trial.
Liability for Infringem ent
W ithout the benefit of the DMCA safe
B.
harbor, the Coud must still determine
whether Hotfile is Iiable for the copyright violations committed by its users. The DMCA
does not supplant common Iaw principles of liability, and a finding that such a protection
is unavailable does not necessarily mean that liability for infringement on the system is
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proper. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. k', Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1039-40 (9tln Cir.
2013) ('(W Je are not clairvoyant enough to be sure that there are no instances in which
a defendant otherwise Iiable for contributory copyright infringement could meet the
prerequisites for one or more of the DMCA safe harbors. W e therefore think it best to
conduct the two inquiries independently - although, as willappear, aspects of the
inducing behavior that give rise to liability are relevant to the operation of some of the
DMCA safe harbors and can, in some circumstances, preclude their application.'l',
Perfect 10: Inc. e. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 2 1 3 F. Supp. 2d 1 146, 1 174 (C.D, Cal.
2002) ('These dsafe harbors' do not affect the question of ultimate Iiability under the
various doctrines of direct, vicarious, and contributory liability . . . Rather they Iimit the
relief available against service providers that fal within these safe harbors.'l; cfk Flava
Works, /nc., 689 F.3d at 758 ('1(A) noninfringer doesn't need a safe harbor.').
Couds have struggled with defining the Iiability of Internet-based companies that
provide the technological mechanism to foster, or at least enable, others to infringe.
This confusion and uncedainty prompted in pad the enactment of the DMCA. See, e.g.,
Sony Corp. of Am. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 n. 1 7 (1 984)
('sony/Betamax'j (noting that tthe lines between direct infringement, contributory
infringement, and vicarious Iiability are not clearly drawn' (quoting district coud
decisionll; Flava Works, Inc. ,689 F.3d at 76O (ldThe only distinctions relevant to this
case are between direct infringement . . . and contributory infringement, and between
contributory infringement and noninfringement.').
Even so, couds have recognized the value and remaining viability of a claim of
secondary liability: 'W hen a widely shared service or product is used to commit
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infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively
against aII direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go against the
distributor of the copying device for secondary Iiability on a theory of contributory or
vicarious infringement.' Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokste6 Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 929-30 (2005) (citation omittedl; Perfect 10, Inc.v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d
1 146, 1 171 n. 1 1 (9th Cir. 2007) (slcjopyright holders cannot protect their rights in a
meaningful way unless they can hold providers of such services or products
accountable for their actions.') These theories of secondary liability - contributory
infringement, inducementIiability and vicarious liability - are coud-created and do not
rely on the Copyright Act or another statute. See Viacom lnt'l Inc. , 676 F.3d at 28 n.5
(citing Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930-31),' Perfect 10, lnc. B.Visa Int'l Selv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d
788, 795 (9th Cir. 2007) ('contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary
liability with roots in the tod-law concepts of enterprise liability and imputed intent.').
1. Inducement and Contributory Infringem ent
decision in Grokster observed that 'slolne
infringes contributorily by intentionaly inducing or encouraging direct infringement,' 545
U.S. at 929. dlclontributory Iiability is based on the defendant's failure to stop its own
actions which facilitate third-pady infringement.' Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1 175.
The theory has two requirements:
The Supreme Court's seminal 2005
(1) the defendant knows of direct infringement, and
(2) the defendant dtinduces, causes, or materialy contributes to Ithatl infringing conduct.'
Napsten Inc., 239 F.3d at 1020 (internal quotation and citations omited). To 'estabfish
inducement Iiability, it is crucial to establish that the distributors communicated an
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inducing message to their . . . users.''Visa Int'l Sem. Ass'n, 494 F.3d at 801 (internal
quotation omited).
Thus, to establish this derivative Iiability, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie
case of direct infringement by a third pady, which is done by proving ownership of a
padicular work and evidence of unauthorized copying. Napsten Inc., 239 F.3d at 1013
n.2; Situation Mgmt. Sys.: Inc. B. ASP Consulting LLC, 56O F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009)
(quoting Feist Publbs, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serz Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). In this
case, the padies do not dispute that the Studios own 3,800 works at issue and that they
have properly registered them under Section 41 1 of the Copyright Act. Moreover, while
Hotfile takes issue with the Studios' method for proving infringement, it does not dispute
that at Ieast some of the Studios' works have been illegaly copied or downloaded using
the Hotfile system . This has caused the Studios to Iose money they would have earned
from Iicensing the content to users and because of the threat of fudher downstream
S'viral' distributions. The W aterman study and the facts of the counterclaim provide
competent proof in that regard', any other questions merely go to the Ievel of damages.
CL Fung, 710 F.3d at 1034.
The more vexing question here concerns the hallmark of this type of Iiability -
whether intent can be expressly shown or inferred from Hotfile's actions. The Studios
alege that infringement is a natural consequence of Hotfile's business model; that the
company 'actively fosters' m assive copyright infringement to increase its revenue; and
that despite storing al infringing content on its servers, it failed to mitigate infringement.
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a. Grokster-type Intent
In this regard, couds have held that even though an entity merely distributes a
be Iiable for inducement if thedevice that causes infringement, it may nonetheless
defendant has 'sthe object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear
expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.' Grokster, 545 U.S.
at 919. Liability m ay be imposed 'if the actor knowingly takes steps that are
substantialy cedain to result in ( ) direct infringement.' Amazon.com: Inc., 508 F,3d at
1 170. Or, a defendant can encourage or induce infringement through cedain acts,
'such as advedising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use.'
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (citations and internal quotations omitted). In addition to
these methods of directly proving intent, an actor may be Iiable under older common Iaw
theories based on im puting intent, such as by knowing of specific acts of infringement
and failing to act or by providing 'material suppod' to those who commit infringement.
As discussed below, there is disagreement as to the parameters of these doctrines,
whether they continue to apply, and what defenses may be applicable to counter the
deleterious effect they may have on innovation and the benefits of technology.
The decision in Groksfer illustrates what unquestionably suffices to show actual
intent. There, a group of copyright holders consisting of recording companies,
songwriters and m usic publishers sued companies that distributed software products
enabling peer-to-peer file sharing among users. 545 U.S. at 919. The defendants did
not maintain copies of files on their servers, did not know which files their users were
transm itting, and did not effectively control user-behavior. Id. at 920 & n.1, 922. But
evidence showed that 'dthe probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering' and
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that the defendants were aware of the nature of the infringement. Id. at 923. Sim ilar to
the facts of this case, an exped commissioned by one of the plaintiffs concluded that 90
percent of the files on one of the systems were infringing, although the defendants
raised methodological chalenges, suggested that the software had significant
noninfringing uses, and provided other 'danecdotal and statistical evidence' to show that
files might not have been copyright protected. Id. at 922-23. Finaly, e-mails from users
'with questions about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded' and
notifications from one of the plaintiffs about the infringing nature of cedain files
demonstrated the defendants' knowledge of the fact of infringement. Id. at 923.
The Coud went beyond knowledge of infringement, however, to address actual
evidence of intent. It concluded that the defendants ldclearly voiced the objective that
recipients use it to download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to
encourage infringement.' Id. at 923-24. In particular, one of the defendants designed
and advedised software to compete with a system that was ruled to have been
infringing (Napster), thereby 'aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement.' Id. at 924, 939. Their business models were centered on advertising
revenue driven by the popularity of content, which the coud equated with infringing
content and which confirmed dlthat (defendants') principal object was use of their
software to download copyrighted works.' Id. at 926 (dlusers seeking Top 40 songs, for
example, or the Iatest release by Modest Mouse, are cedain to be far more numerous
than those seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and Streamcast translated that
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' 16 Finally the Coud found that com panies failed to develop toolsdemand into dolars
. ) ,
'to diminish the infringing activity lofl usingtheir software,' thereby underscoring their
d'intentional facilitation of their users' infringement.' Id. at 939.
After discussing the plaintiffs' prima facie case of Iiability for inducement and
vicarious Iiability, which fall under the umbrela of secondary Iiability, the Grokster Court
considered defenses. In padicular, it discussed its holding in Sony/Betamax, which the
coud of appeals had applied in affirming the district coud's grant of summary
17 That decision applied the 'staple adicle of commerce doctrine' andjudgment.
concluded that an actor distributing a commercial product (such as a video recording
device) is not Iiable for acts of infringement, even if it knows of actual or likely
infringement, unless the product is incapable of substantial noninfringing uses.
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 932-333 (discussing the holding of Sony/Betamax). The Court
sought to balance the harms that infringement has on copyright owners with the effect
Iiability m ight have in stifling commerce and innovation, Thus, it suggested that the
doctrine applies only to circumstances where no intent to promote infringing uses can
be imputed from the design of a distributed product and where the defendant has not
dlexpressed an object' of bringing about infringement, such as by advedising uses that
16 This was contrary to the district coud's conclusion that the defendants were
entitled to summary judgment and its reasoning that distributing the software S'did
not provide the distributors with actual knowledge of specific acts of
infringement.' Id. at 927 (citing district coud decision).
Similar to the appelate coud's holding, prior precedent in the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that Sony/Betamax applies to al forms of contributory Iiability.
Cable/Home Comm'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc. , 9O2 F.2d 829, 845 (1 l'th Cir.
1990) (slcontributory infringement wil not be found if the product in question is
capable of 'substantial noninfringing uses,' the determinative issue in Sony, and
clarified in that case as wide use for Iegitimate, unobjectionable purposes.''
(quoting Sony/8elamax, 464 U.S. at 442)).
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are necessarily infringing. Id. at 933. ln other words, the Sony/Betamax rule doe's not
bar Iiability where a plaintiff pleads an inducement theory of secondary Iiability premised
on actual evidence of intent. Id. at 933 ('Sony barred secondary Iiability based on
presum ing or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution
of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used
for infringement. . . . Because Sony did not displace other theories of secondary Iiability,
and because we find below that it was error to grant summary judgment to the
companies on MGM'S inducement claim, we do not revisit Sony further.').
The Grokster Coud concluded that 'one who distributes a device with the object
of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement by third padies,' and, in that instance, the staple adicle of commerce
doctrine does not act as an affirmative defense. ld. at 936-37. A showing of intent
requires evidence of active steps taken to entice or persuade another to infringe and
cannot be established from dsmere knowledge of infringing potentialj' lactual infringing
uses,' 'a failure to take affirmative
incident to product distribution, such as offering customers technical suppod or product
updates.' /d. at 935-37, 939 n.12, 940 (stating that the fact that a business model
benefits from infringement could not alone 'justify an inference of unlawful intent, but
viewed in the context of the entire record its impod is clear').
steps to prevent infringement,' or d'ordinary acts
Instead, Iiability must be
Id. at 937.premised on 'purposeful
, 
culpable expression and conduct.'
Based on the evidence presented, the Coud in Groksfer found an 'unlawful
objective' that was lunmistakeable': the system was used predominately to infringe.
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The Coud predicated its conclusion on the facts that the defendants learned of the
infringing nature ofuse when providing technical assistance'
, 
the business com peted
with another system whose users were known to have infringed'
, 
the business model
was driven by the availability of unlicensed content'
, 
and the defendants took no
meaningful steps to prevent infringement.l8 /J
. at 941.
b.
Developing guidance for
Material Contribution Liability
some of Grokster's unanswered questions, a more
recent case from the Southern District of New York reviewed the file sharing service
LimeW ire and addressed how the legal theories of inducement of infringement
,
contributory infringement, common Iaw infringement and unfair competition fit together
.
Lime Group, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 409. The service at issue employed peer-to-peer
technology through which software created by the defendants took an inventory of files
on users' computers and allowed others to search for and download them directly. Id.
at 410-41 1 . The same exped engaged by the Studios in this case, Dr. W aterman,
concluded that 98.8 percent of the files downloaded through LimeW ire were not
authorized for free distribution and that 43.6 percent of those files were owned by the
plaintils in the action. Id. at 412. The coud determined that there was sufficient
evidence of direct infringement by LimeW ire users and that the W aterman repod
provided competent proof of the scope of that infringement. Id. at 422-24.
On the issue of Groks/estype inducement, the coud found that summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was warranted. Id. at 426. Evidence cited by the
18 Ultim ately
, on remand, the district coud entered summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiffs on the issue of Iiability. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc.
Groksteri Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 999 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
65
Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW   Document 534   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013   Page 65 of 99
coud to establish the defendants' awareness of infringement included: (1) the scope of
the infringement, which revealed that ldmost actual downloads involve unauthorized
contenti' (2) internal communications that not only noted that users were sharing digital
recordings, but also acknowledged that they were copyrighted (including a document in
which the defendants considered legitimizing and monetizing user activityl; (3) the fact
that the infringing nature of the activity was communicated to defendants through user
e-mails and the company maintained adicles about infringement in a file Iabeled
'Knowledge of lnfringementi' and (4) the fact that the defendants provided technological
assistance with files that 'plainly relateld) to unauthorized sharing of digital recordings.'
Id. at 426-28.
Moreover, Iike the network in Grokster, the defendants developed business
networks; their advedisements intimated illegalstrategies to target users of shuttered
uses; and their revenue relied on the popularity of content that was indirectly tied to
infringement. Id. at 427-29. Other attributes of the LimeW ire software suggested that it
was designed with infringement in mind.
also suggested popular
The program not only enabled searches, but
and copyrighted recordings to users; the defendants even
tested its functionality using protected titles. Id. at 428.Moreover, the defendants failed
to implement any sod of technical barrier ordesign choice to diminish infringement',
instead, while existing technology could have been applied to infringing works, that
filtering technology was disabled by default (and had to be enabled by users). /d. at
429-430. Finally, the defendants had considered alternative business models, including
opening a store to guide users to Iicensed content. /d. This evidence was su#icient to
show the same kind of unm istakeable intent as existed in Grokster.
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But in addressing other common Iaw principles of secondary infringement, Judge
W ood concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. The decision made a
distinction between inducement liability, which requires Grokster-Lype evidence of intent,
and contributory infringement Iiability, which does not so long as a defendant's
df terial.' 19 Id at 432
. 
Under the contributorycontribution to infringing activities is ma .
infringement theory of Iiability, the coud found that the evidence was sufficient to show
the defendants' knowledge of and material contribution to substantial infringing adivity.
Id. at 434. However, applying the Sony/Betamax rule, the coud found there was
insufficient evidence that the LimeW ire service was incapable of substantial
noninfringing uses. Id. The coud observed that, while the LimeW ire service was used
'overwhelmingly for infringement' at the time of the decision, the deferldants
demonstrated substantial noninfringing uses that existed or were Iikely to develop,
19 The decision reasoned that Groksfer answered the question of inducement
liability but failed to determine ldwhether the Ninth Circuit had been correct in
granting summary judgment on the contributory infringement claim.' Id. at 433.
The concurring opinions in Grokster debated whether the noninfringing uses
identified by the defendants were sufficient to merit summary judgment, but
agreed that the Sony/Betamax rule continues to act as a defense to contributory
infringement. Id. at 433 (citing concurring opinionsl', see also Alfred C, Yen,
Torts and the Construction of Inducement and Contributory Liability in Amazon
and Visa, 32 Colum J.L. & Ads 513, 513 (2009) ('tIn (Groksferl,
Court adopted intentional inducement as a cause of action for third pady
copyright Iiability. Before Grokster, such Iiability existed in two forms,
contributory Iiability and vicarious Iiability Now, after Groksfer, a defendant
also faces Iiability if she acts with the object of promoting infringement by others.'
(footnote omitedl). Other decisions have suggested that two categories of
contributory infringement liability exist - 'actively encouraging (or inducing
infringement through specific acts or ( ) distributing a product distributees use
to infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable of lsubstantial' or
dcommercially significant' noninfringing uses' - and that Sony/Betamax serves as
a defense where the Iatter is asseded. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1 170
the Supreme
(quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurringl).
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including distribution of non-protected works.Id. Thus, under the Lime Group analysis,
the Sony/Betamax rule may still be raised as a theory of defense where the intent to
infringe or induce infringement is not explicit, but rather is imputed from a defendant's
material contribution to infringement.
Several other couds have considered the material contribution theory of liability
but have not always addressed the applicability of the Sony/Betamax defense under
that theory. In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. q 996),
operators of a swap meet where counterfeit goods were sold were deemed to have
provided the 'suppod services' for infringement, including 'the provision of space,
utilities, parking, advedising, plumbing, and customers,' such that the swap meet
operators could be held Iiable. Id. at 263. Extending that theory of Iiability to the
Internet context, the district coud in Napsler found the search and directory features of
the music sharing program to be ldan Internet swap meet.' A&M Records; Inc.
Napsten Inc., 1 14 F. Supp. 2d 896, 919-20 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting briefing), aff'd in
parf & rev'd in parl, 239 F.3d 1 004, 1 022 (9th Cir. 2001).
Grokster decision, the Ninth Circuit found that the
applicable to instances
structure of the system, but inapplicable to instances where the defendant has identified
specific information regarding infringing activity. Napsfer, 239 F.3d at 1020-22. W hile
On appeal, albeit in a pre-
Sony/Betamax defense was
in which intent to promote infringement was imputed from the
the coud concluded that the defendants were also Iiable under a Fonovisa material
contribution theory, it did not address whether the Sony/Betamax defense applies under
that theory. Id. at 1022.
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ln In re Aimster, 'lilnstead of parking spaces, advedisements, and plumbing,' the
defendants 'provided the software and the suppod services necessary for individual
Aimster users to connect with each other . . . managlingl to do everything but actualy
steal the m usic off the store shelf and hand it to Aimster users.' 252 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
The coud disalowed the Sony/Betamax defense, reasoning that the online network had
an ongoing relationship with the direct infringer, as opposed to merely providing the
means to commit infringement in a single point-of-sale transaction, Iike selling a VCR -
20 Moreover
, 
the Aimsteran argument aggressively pursued by the Studios in this case.
technology permitted mass distribution of infringing content rather than 'private, home
use copyinga' Id. at 653. Rather than focusing solely on the features of the tstaple
article of commerce doctrine, the decision made a distinction that would be echoed
three years Iater in Grokster : there was both a Iack of evidence that the technology
had legitimate purposes and significant evidence that the defendant intended to foster
infringement. Id. at 652-64.
For the most pad, as in Lim e Group, recent decisions have suggested that the
Sony/Betamax rule applies wherever material contribution is at issue. See, e.g., Capitol
Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., No. 12 Civ. 95 (RJS), 2013 W L 12861 34, at *1 3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 2013) (dHowever, even where a defendant's contribution is material, it may
evade liability if its product is tcapable of substantial noninfringing uses.'' (quoting
Sony/Betamax, 464 U.S. at 442)).
20 W hile other couds have used this distinction to decline to apply the
Sony/Betamax rule, this Coud includes the analysis of an ongoing relationship in
the vicarious liability context. As explained below, that theory of Iiability
examines a defendant's relationship with, and control over, direct infringers to
hold the defendant Iiable, just as a principal may be Iiable for the actions of his
agent.
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C. Know ledge of Infringing Content
and Failure to Remove
Finally, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Perfect 1O, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. shows
that the Grokster decision does not foreclose other common Iaw principles of imputing
intent. In padicular, a provider may face Iiability where it knows of padicular instances
of infringement - rather than simply that the system is capable of infringement or
generaly peqmits some Ievel of infringement - and fails to act to remove it. There, a
copyright owner sued two companies,one of which (Google) operated a search engine
that permitted users to search the Internet for images and facilitated downloads of those
im ages from third-pady websites by Iinking to them . 508 F.3d at 1 155-56. On the issue
of secondary infringement, it was undisputed that the third padies did not have
permission to display plaintiff's images on their websites and that some direct
infringement had occurred. Id. at 1 169.
The padies disagreed, however, as to whether Google fostered infringement
through specific acts under Groksler. Although there was no suggestion that Google
actually induced copyright infringement, the Ninth Circuit applied common Iaw tod
principles of fault-based Iiability to reason that 'an actor may be contributorily çiable for
intentionally encouraging direct infringement if the actor knowingly takes steps that are
substantialy certain to result in direct infringement.' Id. at 1 170-71 & n.1 1. It also relied
on its pçe-Grokster decision in Napsfer, which held that 'ùif a computer system operator
learns of specific infringing material on his system and fails to purge such material from
the system, the operator knows of and contributes to direct infringem ent' under a
material contribution theory. Id. at 1 171 . The coud was persuaded by the reasoning
that secondary infringement should be available to provide a practical mechanism for
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preventing direct infringement. Id. at 1 172. Because the district coud had applied a
different standard and there was evidence that S'Google substantialy assistled) websites
to distribute (users') infringing copies to a worldwide market and assistled) a worldwide
audience of users to access infringing materials,' Google could have been Iiable if it
21failed to take simple measures to prevent damage to the plaintiff
. Id.
Application of Precedent
Against this body of jurisprudence, the Coud sets out the standard for
inducement and contributory infringement liability it applies here. First, while it may be
unclear whether Groksfer introduced a new category of Iiability based on inducement or
whether it spoke to pre-existing notions of contributory liability,
d.
it is evident that a
defendant will be liable for actually expressing an intention to foster infringement. If that
intent is express or can otherwise be said to be 'unmistakeable,' the Sony/Betam ax
defense will not apply and the defendant will be liable for aII acts of direct infringement
committed using its system, as was the case in Groksfer. Similarly, as explained in
Amazon.com , where traditional principles perm it a coud to impute intent - for instance,
where the defendant knows of specific infringing content available on its system yet fails
to remove it - that defendant may be Iiable, by operation of Iaw, just as if he had
actualy intended to infringe under Groksler. Finally, contributory infringement may be
21 On remand, the district coud rejected the plaintiff's request for a preliminary
injunction because the plaintiff failed to show that individual notices of
infringement that had elicited no response were adequate to confer knowledge of
infringement on Google. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. CV 04-9484 AHM
(SHx), 2010 W L 9479060, at *6-7 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2010). Plaintiff also failed
to show that practical and simple measures to prevent infringement were
available to Google as a viable remedy. Id. at *7. Nor could the plainti: meet the
other requirements for a preliminary injunction. Id. at *14. The decision was
affirmed, 653 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2O1 1), and cediorari was denied by the Supreme
Coud, 132 S.Ct. 1713 (Mar. 5, 2012).
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found based on a material contribution theory in instances where a defendant did not
express an intention to foster infringement but provided the means for infringement or
distributed a comm ercial product that was subsequently used to infringe. Under that
theory, the Sony/Betamax rule provides a backstop to Iiability, immunizing a defendant
who demonstrates that noninfringing uses of the system are substantial. The Studios
have raised claims and presented facts related to each of these theories of Iiability.
As a prelim inary matter, it should be understood that although Hotfile has many
unique characteristics, it is also true that it shares many of the attributes that have
22 Most notably
, 
the Coud concludes that the extent ofdoomed other networks
.
infringement by Hotfile's users was staggering, as was the case in Grokster. On this
point, Hotfile questions the W aterman study and its finding of a respective 90.2% and
5.3% rate of infringement and noninfringement based on an exam ination of files that
had been downloaded. The Coud agrees that the study assumed an infringing purpose
and that an examination of uploaded files - including those that were never shared or
downloaded - would Iikely have shown a Iower infringement rate and aiternative uses
for Hotfile's system apart from infringement (as Hotfile's exped, Dr. James Boyle, points
out). lt may also be true, as Hotfile argues, that the W aterman study examined too
short of a time period (i.e., one month of data) and improperly excluded entire
categories of files that would have resulted in an even Iower rate,
Despite Hotfile's quarrel with the W aterman rate and suggestion that it is
somewhat high, it cannot dispute that an enormous amount of infringement has actually
22 The Studios contend that Hotfile is similar to other infringing networks, such as
Grokster, Fung, Streamcast, Usenet.com, and LimeW ire.
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occurred on Hotfile's system. For example, the record reflects a Iarge number of DMCA
notices received by Hotfile - eight million in total. As is explained in the Coud's
discussion of the counterclaim , only a relatively smal number of the notices pedaining
to W arner have been claimed to be incorrect and noninfringing, suggesting the same
m ay be true of the other sets of notices Hotfile received from the Studios. Moreover,
while the Coud cannot deduce that every file posted by a repeat infringer is actually
infringing, the uploads of those subject to three or more notices constituted 44 percent
of aI files on Hotfile (and half of al downloaded files) in February 2O1 1 . At the very
Ieast, this shows that a high number of Hotfile users Iikely engaged in infringement - the
vast majority of Hotfile's top affiliates, and wel over 20,000 of its users - and were likely
responsible for a substantial amount of infringement. Indeed, the Studios have
identified over 900,000 files containing their own works that were available for the
taking. These numbers are consistent with the demonstrated outcome of Hotfile's post-
Com plaint policy changes, which Hotfile asseds were effective in combatting
infringement and resulted in the termination of affiliates and users, deletion of files, and
a substantial drop in revenue.
The Court can also conclude that Hotfile became aware of the general fact of
infringement - although possibly not its scale - at least when it received DMCA notices
through its agent and when it was sued or threatened with suit by copyright holders.
Documents produced in discovery suggest that Hotfile was aware it was becoming 'the
flagship of non-licensed contenti' that if it had examined the files on its system , it would
have known of the infringing activity', and that it was doing business with those it
suspected were infringers Iike the affiliate Planetsuzy. Hotfile provided the means of
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infringement', it created and currently maintains the Ho/ile website
, 
which Hoiile's
members actually use to infringe.
own servers, in contrast to
information resides on users' computers.
Users even store the infringing content on Hotfile's
decentralized peer-to-peer networks, in which the
Finally, there is some evidence suggestive of a deliberate design to facilitate
infringement. Hotfile is deliberately modeled after networks thatwere subsequently
subject to chalenges of infringement; its incentive structure rewards Iarge and frequent
file downloads', it pays mem bers through an affiliate program; and it relies on the
popularity of content to drive growth, even imploring users to post uinteresting' Iinks and
media files. The fact that it actually pays infringers for this activity is, as the S'tudios
argue in briefing, 'simply unprecedented.' Hotfile also provides technical assistance to
those who infringe, b0th by answering specific questions from users about downloading
media and by providing tutorials that reference copyrighted works. And, despite having
the means to implement counter-piracy technologies and to target infringemelnt (as
demonstrated by Hotfile's actions immediately after the Complaint was filed), Hotfile did
not take any meaningful action to cudail infringement. Moreover, it did not have an
effective policy to terminate blatant, repeat infringement, which constituted a substantial
amount of the total infringement, until February 2O1 1. Based on the totality of the
evidence, the Coud concludes that Hotfile was successful in Iarge pad because it did
not control infringement activity on its system.
Nonetheless, the Coud draws distinctions between this case and the case Iaw
recited above in which couds determined that judgment on the question of secondary
Iiability was proper. For instance, despite an increase in user traffic, the Studios have
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shown neither that Hotfile's inspiration,
that Hotfile targeted Rapidshare's
copyright infringement, as
attem pting to become the next Napster.
Rapidshare, actually was a pirate network nor
users to satisfy a known source of demand for
was the situation in cases finding Iiability for networks
Indeed, as shown by th e-mail,
Hotfile apparently viewed the migration of Rapidshare users as a ubad thing.' (Yeh
Decl. Ex. 53 (DE 288-58 (filed under seal; DE 324-11).) Moreover, Hotfile did not
promote any of its files or enable a 5le search function, but instead relied on third-party
affiliates that were responsible for promoting (and essentialy making available)
infringing content. AI infringing activity thus took place between uploading users,
downloading users and affiliates (and not Hotfile). Additionaly, the system has
noninfringing uses ignored in the Studios' focus on downloading activity, such as the
distribution of unlicensed materiais. And Hotfile eventualy developed a notice and
takedown system and, over time, implemented technoiogy to combat infringing users.
Hotfile's general knowledge of infringement, even if rampant, is insufficient by
itself to suppod Iiability. The Studios have not proffered an express statement by Hottile
indicating its intention to foster copyright infringement, that is. clearly voicing an
objective of encouraging infringement. Not one document shows a business plan
contemplating infringing uses or an understanding that Hotfile was actualy assisting
users (individually or as a whole) to commit infringement. Hotfile had no direct
involvement in the acts of infringement (as would be the case if its employees had
posted the Studios' copyrighted content). Unlike Lime Group, there were no
ionsiderations (and rejections) of counter-piracy software, internal communications
acknowledging the ilegal natare of specific network activity, or proposals to legitimize
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user activity. Unlike Grokster, the intent to infringe is not 'unmistakeable' such that it
can be said to be central to the business model and ingrained in the platform's design.
Indeed, Hotfile has, at Ieast, a plausible alternative design model in the form of personal
23data storage
.
Although some evidence shows that Hotfile might have been on notice that
specific acts of infringement were afoot, the evidence does not demonstrate that Hotfile
knew for cedain that the uses were illegal or that Hotfile induced the infringing use. For
example, the Studios assed that users put Hotfile on notice that they were purchasing
premium accounts Slspecificaly to download copyrighted works.' But the document
suppoding this assedion is an e-mail from a prospective user to a Hotfile e-mail address
stating that he 'dwishledj to sign up to Hotfile to down load' eight ldEbooks' of older
novels including Dickens's A Christmas Carol. (Yeh Decl. Ex. 66 (DE 324-12).) lt is
plausible that a service provider, foreign or domestic, might believe that a work from a
19th century English writer is no Ionger subject to copyright protection. The document
shows no response from Hotfile endorsing an illegal use, and nothing about the request
suggests that the user's downloads would be blatantly infringing.
The Studios also alege that Hotfile 'drepeatedly provided technical assistance to
users they knew were seeking to download (infringing) content,' such as by answering
user questions when the link's URL was apparent to Hotfile.(Hotfile could see the URL
But Hotfile points out that itpath of the Iast file downloaded in every communication
.)
had no way of knowing whether the user Iacked perm ission to share the file, whether
23 Based on data, Dr. Boyle concluded that there were substantial noninfringing
uses in the form of open source software and movie sharing, fair use downioads,
storage, and monetizing works owned by creators through the affiliate program .
76
Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW   Document 534   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013   Page 76 of 99
the file contained what the title indicated, or whether the work was actually protected by
copyright. Indeed, the evidence shows that when users indicated to Hotfile that they
were accessing padicular content, they did nothing to conclusively inform Hotfile of the
fact of infringement. W hile the Studios contend that by rewarding distribution of Iarge
and popular downloads (in contrast to promoting storage), Hotfile knew that it was
encouraging the sharing of protected m usic and movies, no documents show that
Hotfile equated popular content with protected content.
Thus, with respect to each example raised by the Studios, a number of questions
remain regarding Hotfile's intent (actual or imputed) to foster infringement and the
capacity for and scope of noninfringing uses of Hotfile's system . For exam ple: lNhen
Hotfile suppoded user activity or communicated with affifiates, did it know that the files
actually contained copyrighted material as the link names or discussion indicated? Did
Hotfile know that the works are currently protected by copyright? Did Hotfile know when
users lacked permission to download cedainworks (which would not have been the
case if the works were user-owned and 'space-shifted,' or if the files were freely-
Iicensed, as the most popular downloads on Hotfile currently are)? W as Hotfile
designed, and is it primarily used, for storage or for distribution? lf the Iatter, did Hotfile
intend to promote the infringement of copyrighted work, or did it merely provide a
service that was ultimately used to infringe? Did Hotile encourage the sharing of
protected content, thereby crossing the threshold from knowledge of infringement to
fostering infringement? In sum, unlike other cases where the evidence of intent is more
com pelling, the record here does not provide an unequivocal picture. The fact that
these questions remain makes summary judgment inappropriate on the theories of
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inducement and contributory infringement liability. And while Hotfile may have a difficult
'innocence' to a jury,24 the genuine issues Of material fact must betime explaining its
resolved by a jury at trial.
2. Vicarious Iiability
The Studios next assed that Hotfile is vicariously Iiable for the actions of its
users. In contrast to contributory Iiability, which focuses on the defendant's actions in
enabling infringement, 'vicarious liability is based on the defendant's failure to cause a
third pady to stop its directly infringing activities.' Amazon.com, Inc. , 508 F.3d at 1 175
(citations omited). Vicarious copyright liability has been described as a variation of the
doctrine of respondeat superior - a form of strict liability premised on agency. See
Fonovisa, Inc. , 76 F.3d at 262. Thus, the doctrine does not require knowledge of the
infringement and may be applied even where the defendant has acted in good faith to
/d 25 vicarious infringement has two elements, occurring Ilwhen one profitsprevent it
. .
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or lim it it.' Luvdarts,
LLC B. A T& F Mobility, LLC, 7 1 0 F. 3d
24 For instance
,
as indicated in the DMCA context, Hotfile's master file policy (which
removed offending links but not the actual file) may mean that Hotfile knew of
padicular infringing files and failed to bar fudher access. Hotfile will also have to
explain how, in each of these instances, it was unaware of the offending nature
of the activity, did not intend to contribute to it, and could not utilize existing
technology to prevent infringement. Finally, to the extent that the Studios
premise Iiability on the fact that Hoiile provided the mechanism for infringement,
Hotfile has suggested Sony/8efamax-type noninfringing uses for the system, and
there is a question of whether those uses are dsubstantial.'
25 Although a defendant's Iack of knowledge may not affect liability in this context, it
does have implications for the measure of damages available under the
Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. j 504(c)(2) (providing that statutory damages may
range from $750 to $30,000 per violation, but capping willful violations at
$150,000 per violationl; see also EMI April Music, Inc. v. White, 618 F. Supp. 2d
497, 507 (E.D. Va. 2009) (citing Nelson-salabes, Inc. ?. Morningside Dev., LLC,
284 F.3d 505, 517 (4th Cir. 2002)).
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U.S. at 930)., A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1022. The determination of whether a
defendant has the capacity to halt infringement is determined by exam ining the
system's ù'current architecture.' Napsfer, 239 F.3d at 1024.
Hotile contends that the Studios cannot show a
infringement because Hotfile charges a fixed rate to
'direct financial benefit' from
users through subscriptions and
does not profit incrementaly from infringement. Hotfile's argument rests on an early
Internet case, Religious Technology Center Netcom On-Line Comm unication
Services, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995), in which a member of a religious
organization posted the plaintiffs' copyrighted works to a computer bulletin board
service. Id. at 1365-66. Those works were automaticaly copied to the defendant's
com puter by the service and thereby made available to users who paid the defendant a
fixed subscription fee. Id. at 1365-68. The coud concluded that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to prevail on their vicarious liability claim because the link between infringement
and revenue was not sufficiently established. Id. at 1376-77.
Notably, howeverr the Netcom coud did not rule that a fixed fee could never
provide a direct benefit basis for vicarious liability. Instead, the court observed that the
plaintiffs failed to show that the policy at issue enhanced dlthe value of (defendant's)
services to subscribers or attractledl new subscribers,' in light of the fact that the
defendant was merely an entity providing Internet access to users. Id. at 1377. Indeed,
the only evidence of such a Iink consisted of a declaration from plaintiffs' counsel stating
that the defendant was concerned it would Iose business if an injunction were to be
granted on the infringement claims.
show the type of financial tie required. 1d.
The coud found such evidence insulicient to
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By contrast, other couds have permitted
even more attenuated than here. In Arista
liability where the financial benefit was
Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 633 F.
Supp. 2d 124 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), the coud rejected an argument that causation was not
established S'because (the defendants) are paid on a per-volume, not per-download,
basis and because infringing music accounts for less than 1% of the newsgroups
available on their service.' Id. at 157. Likewise, in the Ninth Circuit's Napster decision,
an increase in user base - i.e., m ore
and quantity of available m usic
infringement such that they were Iiable. 239
decision).
F.3d at 1023 (quoting lower coud
user registrations - due to the increasing quality
meant that the defendants financially benefitted from
The Napster case posits that only a causal relationship between infringement
and profit must be established Ilregardless of how substantial the benefit is in propodion
to a defendant's overall profits.' Elison v, Robertson, 357 F,3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir.
2004). In other words, lthe law is clear that to constitute a direct financial benefit, the
'draw' of infringement need not be the primary, or even significant, draw - rather, it only
need be 'a' draw.' Usenetcom, lnc., 633 F. Supp. 2d at 157. As one observer noted
after a review of many of these cases, 'lalt present, the dominant view is that any for
profit enterprise could be found vicariously Iiable for copyright infringement however
remote, unquantifiable, and unidentifiable the benefit receives from copyright
infringement may be.' Craig A. Grossman, From Sony to Grokster, the Failure of the
Copyright Doctrines of Contributory Infringement and Vicarious Liability to Resolve the
>ar between Content and Destructive Technologies, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 141 , 230-31
(2005).
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The Court has already concluded that questions remain regarding whether the
financial benefit Hotfile received and the design of its business model are sufficient to
impute intent to induce copyright infringement at this stage
. But the vicarious Iiability
standard requires neither that a defendant have knowledge of the acts of infringement
nor that the defendant receive substantial financial benefit from infringement
. 
Hotfile
concedes that infringement did occur on its system and
, 
while it argues that its support
for infringement would not have made business sense
, it acknowledges that infringing
files drove some amount of sales to Hotfile, as shown by the Zebrak classifications and
W aterman calculations. The infringement-sales connection is also indicated by the
dramatic drop in Hotfile's income after the Complaint was filed and after Hotfile
implemented its three-strikes policy and technologies to ferret out infringers. (See, e.g.,
Yeh Decl. Ex. 70 (DE 288-82 (filed under seal; DE 324-13).) Hotfile may contend that
infringement was not central to its success, but it is undeniable that it financially
benefited from it by atracting some users. This is sufficient to subject Hotfile to
vicarious Iiability under the first prong of the analysis.
As for the second prong - the right to control user conduct and failure to do so -
Hotfile contends that there is a triable issue because Hotfile's content-neutral approach
meant that Hotfile could not determine which files were infringing, thereby depriving it of
the ability to control the infringement. However, a reading of the comm on Iaw standard
suggests that couds have viewed this element expansively, finding that service
providers have the capacity to control the activities of their users simply by vidue of
providing the means to commit direct infringement. See, e.g., Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v.
Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1 159, 1 173 (2d Cir. 1971),. Polygram Int'l Publ'g
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Inc. v. Nevadag lG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1328 (D. Mass. 1994) (reviewing case law,
quoting the Iegislative history of the Copyright Act, and concluding that a defendant has
Sscontrol' if they l'either actively operate or supervise the operation of the place wherein
he erformances occur, or control the content of the infringing programNl.z6t p
For example, in Usenet.com, the defendants maintained online buletin boards
from which users (with a subscription)
633 F. Supp. 2d at 130-131 .
noted that the defendants had a policy that prohibited the sharing of copyrighted
could download copyrighted sound recordings.
As sufficient evidence of the right to control, the court
content; maintained
content; possessed the ability to filter or bjock content, including infringing content; and
ldat times, exercised their right and ability to restrict, suspend, or terminate subscribers,'
such as by suspending accounts of spammers, limiting the activity of those who used a
dispropodionate amount of resources, and restricting downloads of pornographic
material. Id. at 131 , 157. And in the swap meet case, albeit a non-lnternet context, the
site operator could be held vicariously Iiable because it f'patrofled the premises,'
com puter servers that stored and transmitted user-originated
26 It is impodant to note that Section 512(c)(1)(B) of the DMCA excludes
harbor those who dsreceive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing
activity, in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control
such activity.' 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(1)(B). Although phrased in a similar way to
the common Iaw vicarious Iiability standard, couds have read it in the context of
other podions of the DMCA to not foreclose protection for service providers that
would be vicariously liable for users' infringing activity (without 'dsomething more
than the ability to remove or block access to materials posted on a service
provider's website'). Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38 (quotation omittedl; UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. She/ler Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1 006 (9th Cir. 2013).
This not only demonstrates the breadth of each prong of the common Iaw
doctrine, but also indicates that the DMCA precedent Hotfile relies on in its brief
is inapplicable to the discussion here. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mp3tunes,
LLC, No. 07 Civ. 9931 (W HP), 2013 W L 1987225, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. May 14,
from safe
2013).
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'controlled the access of customers to the swap meet area,' and 'Ihad the right to
terminate vendors for any reason whatsoever and through that had the ability to control
the activities of vendors on the premises.' Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 262.
Beyond the right to exclude, the ability to control must be real and practical. In
Perfect 10 v. Amazon.com, Inc., for instance, Google alowed users to search for
images (including infringing images) on others' websites, but could not prevent those
websites from posting infringing content and did not possess image-recognition
technology that could precisely block its users' access to those images. 508 F,3d at
1 174. The coud stated that the alleged offender must have 'dboth a Iegal right to stop or
Iimit the directly infringing conduct, as well as the practical ability to do so.' Id. at 1 175.
Thus, Google was not vicariously liable because it could not control the activities of the
direct infringers (although it could have been contributorily Iiable to the extent it
materialy assisted them). Id. at 1 174-75. And in Luvdarts, LLC, the Ninth Circuit ruled
that mobile wireless carriers could not be held vicariously Iiable for the acts of their
subscribers who alegedly shared access to plaintiffs' protected works. 71O F 3d at
1071-72. Even though the infringement occurred over the service networks that the
defendants ran, the defendants had no way of supervising user activity or implementing
a system to prevent infringement.
The analysis here, based on precedent, is straightforward. Hotfile controls the
means of infringement by among other things mandating user registration and hosting
the infringing materials on its own servers. CL Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d at 1 174
(distinguishing Napsfer, 239 F.3d at 1023-24). Moreover, Hotfile has a stated policy
that permits it to control user activity (and, as in Fonovisa, to exclude users) and
83
Case 1:11-cv-20427-KMW   Document 534   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/20/2013   Page 83 of 99
maintains that it has exercised that control in policing content. Hotfile has also adopted
technology that it claims is effective in filtering and targeting infringing works. These
actions, which benefit Hotfile in an assessment of direct Iiability, belie Hotfile's argument
that it Iacks control because it has no search function and no way to identify or remove
infringing files.
properly exercise its control in light of the number of users who were blatantly infringing
and the estimates of the Studios' expeds regarding the prevalence of protected content
lt is also clear that prior to the filing of the Complaint, Hotfile failed to
available for download.
vicarious liability, and summary judgment is entered in their favor.
C. Anton Titov's Individual Liability
Accordingly, on this record, the Studios have made a case for
In addition to the corporate entity, Hotfile Corp., the Studios have sued Titov in
his individual capacity, seeking to extend any damages that may be awarded against
Hoiile. Titov has filed a separate motion for summary judgment on the issue of his
liability. In this Circuit, 'a corporate officer who directs,controls, ratifies, padicipates in,
or is the m oving force behind the infringing activity, is personally liable for such
infringement.' Babbit Elecs., Inc. v. Dynascan Corp., 38 F.3d 1 161 , 1 184 (1 1th Cir.
1994) (citation omittedl', Southern Bel Tel. & Tel. Co. Assoc. Tel. Directory
Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 , 81 1 (1 1th Cir. 1 985). W hile much of this precedent concerns
corporations that directly violate others' copyrights, it is equally applicable to entities
Iiable for secondary infringement. See Usenet.com, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59 (holding
that director and sole shareholder of companies operating online buletin boards where
infringement occurred was liable under theories of direct and secondary liability for
copyright infringement). The secondary infringement theory focuses on the effect the
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individual had on the decision to commit infringement and looks beyond the corporate
form and principles of limited liability. See Babbit Elecs., lnc., 38 F.3d at 1 184 (citation
omitted).
Alternatively, a pefson m ay be Iiable under a vicarious
responsible for supervising the
'ignorant of the infringement.'
liability theory if he is
infringing activity and benefits from it, even if he is
Southern BeII, 756 F.2d at 81 1 (citations omittedl; see
also Gershwin Pub'g Co., 443 F.2d at 1162 CFor exampie, a person who has promoted
or induced the infringing acts of the performer has been held jointly and severally Iiable
as a tvicarious' infringer, even though he has no actual knowledge that copyright
monopoly is being impaired.') As coufts have recognized,
A
when; (1) the oficer personaly particiqated in the actual infringement', or(2) the officer derived financial beneflt from the infringing activities as
either a major shareholder in the corporation, or through some other
means such as receiving a percentage of tbe revenues from the adivity
giving rise to the infringement' or (3) the officer used the corporation as an:
.instrument to carry out a dellberate infringement of copyright, or (4) the
officer was the dom inant influence in the comoration, and determined the
policies which resulted in the infringement', or (5) on the basis of some
combination of the above criteria.
officercorporate maybe held vicariouslyliable under the Copyright Act
Matvin Music Co. k'.8HC Ltd. P'ship, 830 F. Supp. 651 , 654-55 (D. Mass. 1993)
(summarizing case Iaw) (quotation omitted).
Defendants attempt to minimize Titov's role, arguing that he is an 'engineer,'
t'technologist,' 'employee,' or 'accountantv' rather than a key officer, involved only in
'droutine' administrative matters; that he did not provide the starbup capital or conceive
of the idea for Hofile', that he holds no sway over Hotfile either at the top-level or with
respect to its day-to-day operations', and that '
Defendants' argument rests both on an assertion that Titov
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did not have personal involvement in the decisions giving rise to liability and that the
group dynamic and the presence of more culpable figures
mean that Titov could not have had the requisite degree of control over the
company's decisions to warrant Iiability.
Defendants ilustrate their argument by citing Mozingo v. Correct M anufacturing
Corporation, 752 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1985), which involved a products Iiability claim
against a work platform manufacturer and its president. There, the plaintiff established
that the product was defective at trial, but the district coud directed a verdict on the
issue of the president's personal Iiability, applying a Mississippi doctrine that requkres
that an officer 'directly participates in or authorizes the com mission of a tort' ld. at 171-
The evidence showed that the president organized and owned predecessor
companies that manufactured the defective product. /d. at 172-73. Moreover, the
president expressed 'some reservations concerning the unit's safety' during its
development - possibly touching on the nature of the defect - and 'authorized the
production of a slngle prototype unit.' /d. at 173. Nevertheless, the district coud
characterized his involvement in the development and manufacturing processes as
'tperipheral' and cited his lack of awareness that the product was put into production.
Id. at 174. In affirming, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that 'gilf Ethe presjdent) can be held
personaly liable in this case, any corporate officer who fails to maintain an almost total
ignorance of the products the corporation prodtlces may be personally Iiable in the
event a defective product is produced.' ld.
27 The studios explain that they have not brought suit against these shareholders
because Hotfile proffered Titov as its public face and the Studios only recently
discovered these shareholders' identities.
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However, authority involving copyright infringement is not as stringent in holding
relevant corporate principals Iiable. For exam ple, in Quartet Music 7. Kissim mee
Broadcasting, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 1 10O (M.D. Fla. 1992), a group of music publishers
brought suit against a radio station and its president for broadcasting music in a manner
inconsistent with a Iicensing agreement. Id. at 1 101. Issuing a decision after a bench
trial, the court juxtaposed the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Southern Bel and two
district coud cases, Warner Brothers Inc. B. Lobster Pot Inc., 582 F. Supp. 478 (N.D.
Ohio 1984), which imposed Iiability against a president who oversaw a restaurant where
unauthorized performances of m usic were held, and 8roadcasf Music, Inc. v. Behulak,
651 F. Supp. 57, 61 (M.D. Fla. 1986), which, by contrast, immunized a corporate officer
who was merely a 'silent padner' in the Iounge where infringement occurred. Quartet
Music, 795 F. Supp. at 1 103-04. The coud concluded that the president was iable for
copyright infringement notwithstanding his corporate role because of his participation in
the activities of the business and the conduct at issue; he had been involved in litigation
concerning similar claims, his company had been given notice of the aleged
infringement, he ran the radio station's operations, and he had the right to supervise the
infringing activity. Id. at 1 104.
W hile Quartet Music
infringing activities, one judge in this district has observed that çsouthern Bel does not
require ultim ate authority, nor does it require only one person to have authority.'
Foreign Imported Prods. & Publ'g, Inc. v. Grupo Indus. Hotelero, S.A., No. 07-22066
CIV, 2008 W L 4724495, at *14 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 24, 2008). Numerous other couds
suppod that proposition. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Redd Horne, Inc.,
involved a single owner with exclusive control over the
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749 F.2d 154, 160 (3d Cir. 1984) (aftirming order imposing Iiability against both the
president and sole shareholder of a defendant entity, as wel as his brother, who was
not a stockholder or officer but gave the impression that he was a principal in the
business venturel; Pickwick Music Corp. v. Record Prods., Inc., 292 F. Supp. 39, 41
(S,D,N.Y. 1968) (finding Iiability for three defendants who formed and ran a corporation,
although they had different responsibilities for recording, editing, and seling an
infringing record, but not two others who had Gpe#ormed merely ministerial office
functionsf), 'Corporate officers have been held Iiable for the copyright infringement
committed by their corporate entity in a variety of situations.' Blendingwell Music, Inc. b',
Moor-Law, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Del. 1985) (parentheticaly citing examples).
By contrast, Defendants point to no precedent suggesting that a multitude of culpable
actors - and thus, the lack of a single 'icentral figure' - is determinative of liability.
Moreover, Defendants' contention that the padicular facts of this case make it
incomparable to any other is unpersuasive, since the halmarks of padicipation, control,
and benefit are undeniably present here. First, Titov is a high-ranking, central figure at
Hotfile. He owns a stake in the company nearly as Iarge as its other shareholders
and runs it in equal part; and govern Hotfile by
consensus, In his role, Titov has advanced, rejected, agreed upon or failed to block
every decision that has shaped the company, including the efforts Hotfile took to identify
and remove infringing content, ' im plementing and eventualy eliminating the master 5le
poiicy, and deciding how to reward Hotfile's affiliates. Moreover, Titov
was indispensable in the company's formation, crucial to the
development of its business model, and continues to be involved in its business
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strategy. Titov acknowledges possessing power of attorney for the company and acting
as its manager when authorized.
In addition, Titov has personaly had a hand in every aspect of the conduct
underpinning the Studios' theories of liability in this case. For example, at the outset,
Titov wrote the programming code that runs the Hotfile interface and enables direct
infringers to upload and download protected works. More recently, he undertook a
management role in which he oversees contractors working for Hotfile and padicipates
in maintaining Hotfile's storage and delivery technology. Titov also has a significant
im pact in his work for Hotfile's related entities. He is the sole owner, manager and
director of Lemuria, which owns and maintains the servers on which the infringing files
at issue are stored, and he is the managing director of Hotfile Ltd., which colects
subscription fees from users and pays affiliates. Together, these companies provide
mechanisms necessary for Hotfile to' colect its revenue, for its users to access its
services, and for the entire system to sustain business and grow.
The Studios have also pointed to specific evidence showing Titov's actual
awareness of infringement on Hotfile's network. For example, he understood from his
conversations with that Hotfile acquired users migrating from Rapidshare
wben that network was sued for infringem ent. He also expressed the concern that
Hotfile would become the 'flagship' for non-licensed content and was a party to
comm unications claim ing that certain files were infringing. Significantly, Titov appears
on nearly every document that the Couft considered in determining liability. Titov also
put in place Hotfile's DMCA agent, who received m ilions of infringement notices. Thus,
while the Court acknowledges that Titov may not have gone so far as to personaly
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engage in acts of direct infringement, and that any one of his functions might not give
rise to Iiability on its own, the totality of the circumstances suppods Iiability. In contrast
to other cases, his role js not peripheral, his function is not that of m erely a silent
shareholder or ordinary employee, and his duties are not just ministerial.
The Studios have shown sufficient financial benefit and control for the Coud to
conclude that Titov is Iiable under a vicarious Iiability theory.
requirement - financial benefit - the evidence shows that
Vvith regard to the first
as the company earned
money from new subscriptions (some podion of which was atributable to the availability
of infringing materials), so did Titov. Titov also instructed empfoyees to ban one user,
demonstrating his ability to block or exclude Hotfile's clientele. And, as noted
previously, the record shows Titov's impact in determining Hotfile's policies and his
dominant influence on the corporation. To the extent that Hotfile can be found Iiable on
any of the theories discussed above, the Court finds that Titov was a critical actor in the
underlying operations. Thus, there are no disputed facts that preclude a finding that
Titov is vicariously Iiable for the acts of infringement occurring on Hotfile's network.
In a final effod to avoid Iiability, Defendants contend that Titov - a Russian citizen
who resides in Bulgaria - is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Florida. Titov has
advanced this assedion at least twice in this case: as a defense in his Answer and by
asking the Studios not to serve him while he attended mediation in this jurisdiction.
However, Titov failed to address the issue in the motion to dismiss he filed on March 31 ,
201 1 (DE 50), which chalenged only whether the Complaint stated a claim for relief
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)
provides that a pady waives cedain defenses that could have been raised under Rule
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12(b) - such as Iack of personal jurisdiction - by failing to interpose them in the first
pleading. Rule 12(h) is explicit, requires compliance, and means that Titov has
proceduraly waived the personal jurisdiction issue.
Inc. v. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 249 F. App'x 534,
district court's finding of non-waiver of personal jurisdiction where counsel had not seen
See, e.g., Boston Telecomms. Grp.,
537 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing
a copy of the complaint, moved to dismiss for insufficiency of process, and stated that
he reserved the right to file a supplemental motion to dismiss).
Moreover, a Iong Iitany of cases establishes the common Iaw principle that a
pady waives such a defense by appearing generally and Iitigating the merits of a claim ,
as Titov has done here. See, e.g., Ins. Corp. of Ireland; Ltd.v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 706 (1982) (noting that where personal jurisdiction is
Iacking, the defendant has the choice of ignoring the proceedings and raising a
collateral challenge in enforcement proceedings or appearing specifically to chalenge
I isdictionl.z8 After stumbling upon a personal jurisdiction chalenge buriedpersona jur
deep in the summary judgment briefing, the Coud finds no indication that Titov is
28 In Gerber v
. Riordan, 649 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 201 1), for example, a pro se
defendant filed a motion to dismiss for Iack of personal jurisdiction, which was
denied for procedural reasons. The defendant then obtained an attorney who
entered an appearance, moved to stay pending arbitration, sought to vacate a
default judgment that had been entered, opposed a request for mediation,
padicipated in a case management and pretrial conference, sought to enforce a
settlement agreement, and engaged in discovery. Id. at 518-19. After noting the
Iack of precedent in the area, the coud considered whether filings and
appearances that are distinct from jurisdictional chalenges - such as anything
that would d'cause the coud to go to some effod that would be wasted if personal
jurisdiction is Iater found Iacking' - waive a personal jurisdiction defense. Id. at
519 (citations and quotation omitted). W hile some of those actions might have
indicated that the pady did not submit to the coud's jurisdiction or that the
defendant sought merely to postpone the case, the filing of a general appearance
'constituted a voluntary acceptance of the district coud's jurisdiction.'
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avoiding a defense of the suit on the merits. To the contrary,in asserting defenses,
filing motions related to the record, and personally attending oral argument, Titov has
submited to - has invoked - the jurisdiction of this Coud. The Coud finds Titov's
contentions that this was the 'first available oppodunity' to raise the issue and that the
Studios l'have waived any waiver argument' disingenuous. If any issue could be
deemed waived, this is and he has.
D. Hotfile's Counterclaim
And finally, the Court turns to Hotfile's counterclaim against Plaintiff W arner.
Notices of infringement are a prominent feature of the DMCA. The statute spells out six
elements for a notice to be effective, specifies requirements the service provider m ust
meet so that it may properly receive notice, requires service providers to act on receipt
of notices such as by removing infringing users' content, and provides a procedure for
chalenging copyright owners' designations. Providing the Iegal basis for Hotfile's
counterclaim, Section 512(9 sets out a private cause of action for anyone who is injured
by a material representation that content or activity is infringing when it is not:
Any person who knowingly materially misrepresents .
that material or activity is infringing shal be liable for any damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees, incurred by the aleged infringer, by
any copyright owner or copyright owner's authorized Iicensee, or by a
service provider, who is injured by such misrepresentation, as the result of
the service provider relying upon such misrepresentation in removing or
disabling access to the material or activity claimed to be infringing, or in
replacing the removed material or ceasing to disable access to it.
under this section .
17 U .S.C. j 512(9.
Section 512(c), dealing with the creation of notices, requires that notices be
accompanied by '(aJ statement that the complaining pady has a good faith belief that
use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright
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owner, its agent, or the law.' 17 U.S.C. j 512(c)(3)(A)(v). Nonetheless, Section 51249
does not impose liability for issuing a defective notice per se, only for making false
claim s of infringement. According to the statute's Iegislative history, the subsection
'establishes a right of action against any person who knowingly misrepresents that
material or activity is infringing' and 'is intended to deter knowingly false alegations to
service providers in recognition that such misrepresentations are detrimental to rights
holders, service, providers, and lnternet users.' S. Rep. No. 105-190 (1998) at 50. In
this regard, Hotfile claims that W arner had actual knowledge that the identified notices
were false and asseds that it was damaged as a result. W arner, conversely, has
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Hoiile cannot make a sufficient
showing to establish its claim .
Preliminarily, the padies, Iike the Coud, have grappled with several issues
surrounding enforcement of Section 512(9, which is not wel understood. See Ground
Zero Museum Workshop ?. Wilson, 81 3 F. Supp. 2d 678, 704 (D. Md. 201 1) ('dThere is
not a great deal of case law interpreting (Section 512(9).')*, UMG Recordings, /k7c.
Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1 055, 1 065 (C.D. Cal. 2008), af'd on other grounds, 628 F.3d
1 175 (9th Cir. 201 1) (noting Iluncedainty' in the area of Iaw). For instance, both sides
recognize that the statute requires actual, subjective knowledge of the fact of
noninfringement at the time that a takedown notice is made, based upon the theory that
one cannot knowingly misrepresent what one does not understand to be false. See
Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass'n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1 000, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the statute t'encompasses a subjective, rather than objective
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(reasonableness! standard ). Indeed, mistakes, even lunreasonable' mistakes, do not
necessarily cal for Iiability, so long as they are honestly believed. /d. (citing 17 U.S.C. j
512(9).
But Hotsle asks whether certain 'egregious' attributes of W arner's system that
might have prevented it from acquidng subjective knowledge (such as
tly insulate Warner from Iiability for unreasonable mistakes. Compare, e.g., Onlineunjus
Policy Grp. v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1 195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (''Knowingly'
means that a pady actualy knew, should have known if it acted with reasonable care or
diligence, or would have had no substantial doubt had it been acting in good faith, that it
was making misrepresentations.'), with Cabel, 2010 WL 996007, at *4 ('elNlegligence is
not the standard for Iiability under section 512(9.' (citation omittedl), and Augusto, 558
F. Supp. 2d at 1065 (holding that alegations that the counterclaim-defendant 'should
have known better do not create a genuine issue of material facto). Hotfile also asks
29 ln Rossi which is the1 case cited most often in thisarea, the owner of a website
studio trade association that folowed the DMCA'S ncticedirectory sued a m ovie
and takedown procedures,
website would have revealed
Considering Section 512(9's express Ianguage and interpretive case law dealing
with a wide variety of sim ilarly-worded statutes, the Ninth Circuit held that the
statute employs an objective standard and ruled against the plaintiff. /d. at 1004-
05 (stating that the statute protects 'potential violators from subjectively improper
actions by copyright owners'). lnstead of subjective knowledge of
noninfringement, one of the association's members notified it of possible
infringements on the subject website and the website itself suggesled to users
that protected movies could be downloaded by joining. /J. The clear Iesson of
Rossi is that 'as a prerequisite to Iiability under section 512(9, a defendant must
have actual knowledge that it is making a misrepresentation of fact.' Cabel k'.
Zimmerman, No. 09 Civ. 10134 (CM), 2010 WL 996007, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12,
contending that any reasonable investigation of his
that it did not Iink to infringing content. Id. at 1003.
2010) (citations omitted).
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whether
can raise an inference that W arner is liable for possessing guilty knowledge or
support Iiability under a willful blindness theory.
Some couds have cited Section 512(c) to suggest Iiability where a party did not
develop a 'igood faith' or 'sumcient' basis to believe infringement before submitting a
notice. See Dudnikov v. MGA EntmAt, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1013 (D. Colo. 2005)
(holding, in the context of a Section 512(9 claim, that the defendant 'was required to
show that it had a suficient basis to form the required good faith belief that the plaintiffs'
auction infringed on its rights, and that its actions therefore com plied with the notice and
takedown requirements under the DMCAI; but see AlJg&x9/o, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 1065
('congress included an expressly Iimited cause of action for improper infringennent
notifications, imposing liability only if a copyright owner's notification is a knowing
i tation.' (quotation and citations omittedll.3o One coud, in a series of fourm srepresen
decisions, went so far as to hold that prior to submitting a takedown notice, the
copyright holder must consider not only whether the material actualîy belongs to it, but
whether the use of the material lacks an obviously Iawful purpose like fair use. See
Lenz 7. Universal Music Com., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1 15O (N.D. Cal. 2008) ('Lel7z J')
(denying motion to dismissl; Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. C07-3783 JFIIRS),
2008 W L 4790669 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2008) ('Le?7z //') (denying motion for interlocutory
appeal; Lenz v. Universal Music Co@., No. C07-3783 JF, 2010 WL 702466 (N.D. Cal.
30 Rossi itself noted the fact that the defendant in that case had not actualy
downloaded the files, but went on to describe other compelling facts that Ied the
defendant to believe that infringement of its works was occurring.
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Feb. 25, 2010) LuLenz #/') (granting plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on
affirmative defensesl; Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., No. 5:07-cv-O3783-JF, 2013 WL
271673 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2013) (Ml-enz IV') (denying motions for summary
d mentl.3lju g
Thus, if W arner had some sim ilar type of duty, it might find itself vulnerable to suit
because its pre-notice review
Moreover, even if its methodology
were reliable, W arner was concerned with determining whether it owned the works
rather than whether the use of the works infringed on its copyrights to support a proper
512(c) claim. See Sonymetamax, 464 U.S. at 433 ('lAlnyone . . . who makes a fair use
of the work is not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use.'); Amaretto
31 in that case
, 
Stephanie Lenz, a user of the lnternet video hosting site YouTube,
uploaded a video of her family dancing to a song performed by the m usic adist
Prince, which turned out to be wildly popufar among viewers. Lenz 1, 57,2 F.
Supp. 2d at 1 162. The owner of the song, Universal Music Corporation, sent a
takedown notice to the service provider, which notified Ms. Lenz that her video
had been removed because of a claim of copyright infringement, Id. Discovery
revealed that Universal had an employee who was tasked with using YouTube's
system to search for titles owned or administered by Universal. Lenz IV' 2013
W L 271673, at *1 . He stated that he issued a takedown notice whenever he
could recognize a one second or Ionger portion of a Prince song in any video. as
occurred in the video at issue. Id. at *5. His boss stated that Universal seeks to
remove songs 'when a writer is upset or reguests that padicular videos be
removed from Youl-ube,' prom pting Universal to conduct a review. Id.
The court concluded that summary judgment in favor of either party was
improper. Ms. Lenz could show that Universal's procedures might have wilfuly
blinded it to knowledge of her fair use, but not that Universal subjectively
believed that there was a high probability that the video was Iawful or that the
nature of fair use was self-evident. Id. at *6-7 (citing Viacom, 676 F.3d at 34).
Likewise, Universal could not demonstrate the absence of subjective intent. /J.
at *8.
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Ranch Breedables, LLC v. Ozimals, Inc., 79O F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(noting that a Section 512(9 plaintiff can contest the validity of a takedown notification
even where a valid copyright exists). And, W arner's reliance on technology to
accomplish the task might prevent it from forming any belief at al, as the amicus cudae
argues here and a sim ilar group asserted in Rosst 'computers condtlcting automated
searches cannot form a belief consistent with the Ianguage of the DMCA, because they
cannot distinguish between infringing content and content that merely contains words
that suggest infringement.' Rossi, 391 F.3d at 1005 n.7. The Cotlrt! however, is
unaware of any decision to date that actually addressed the need for human review,
and the statute does not specify how belief of infringem ent may be formed or what
knowledge may be chargeable to the notifying entity.
Ultimately, while these are engaging questions surrounding W arner's knowledge',
its responsibility to investigate', whether it had a good faith belief in infringement in each
instance', and whose burden it is to show or refute what - alI issues of first im pression in
this Circuit - there is sufficient evidence the record to suggest that W arner
intentionally taréeted files it knew it had no right to remove. This precludes summary
judgment in its favor. Specificaly, Hotfile has provided the example of JDownloader,
Which W arner did not manage ' '
lt has also shown W arner's interest in an application of its
takedown rights beyond works that it owns. And W arner has not otherwise argued that
it had the right to remove those files, only that its mistakes should be excused. The
Coud finds this motive and other evidence sufficient to sustain an inference that W arner
violated Section 51249, such that these issues should be presented to the jury.
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The only issue remaining is whether Hotfile isable to show any injury for the
deletions, which is an element of a Section 512(9 claim and which W arner questions.
1$A fair reading of the statute, the Iegislative history, and similar statutory Ianguage
indicates that j 512(9 plaintiff's damages must be proximately caused by the
misrepresentation to the service provider and the service provider's reliance or? the
misrepresentation.' Lenz 11, 2010 W L 702466, at *1O (emphasis in original). In this
regard, the Coud observes that the quantity of economic damages to Hotfile's system is
necessarily difficult to measure with precision and has Ied to m uch disagreement
between the padies and their expeds. Notwithstanding this difficulty, the fact of injury
has been shown, and Hotfile's exped can provide the jury with a non-speculative basis
to assess damages. Additionally, Lenz III concluded that the subsection provides for
damages beyond actual damages, even if they are not substantial. Id. at *7-10. C)n this
basis, the Coud concludes that W arner is unable to establish the absence of a genuine
dispute on the issue of damages and cannot prevail at this juncture.
111. CONCLUSION
ln accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
fol Iows :
( 1 ) Hotfile's motion for padial summary judgment for post-complaint DMCA
protection (DE 275, DE 318), Defendant Anton Titov's motion for summary
judgment on personal Iiability (DE 276, DE 316), and W arner's motion for
summary judgment as to Hotfile's counterclaim (DE 255, DE 301) are
DEN IED .
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(2) Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment (DE 280, DE 322) is GRANTED
as to the issues of Defendants' DMCA defense, vicarious Iiability, and Mr.
(2)
Titov's Iiability' lt is DENIED in all other respects.
Except to the extent addressed herein, Defendants' motions to strike Dr.
W aterman's rebuttal repod (DE
declaration (DE 452, DE 460) and certain exhibits (DE 339) in connection
with Plaintiffs' summary judgment briefing; and to strike certain exhibits in
strike Dr. Foster's reply
connection with Plaintiffs' opposition to Mr. Titov's summary judgment
motion (DE 371), are DENIED AS MOOT. Similarly, Plaintiffs' motion to
strike portions of the decjarations of Dr. Andrew Cromady, Dr. Boyle, and
Mr. Titov (DE 387, DE 423) is DENIED AS MOOT.
(4) Warner's motion to use an exhibit from Mr. Titov's deposition at trial (DE
241, DE 297) is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs' Objections to Judge Turnoff's
Repod and Recommendation (DE DE 370) are OVERRULED.
Judge Turnoff's Repod and Recommendation (DE 306) is ADOPTED
AND AFFIRMED.
(5) The padies shall confer and provide to the Coud proposed rèdactions to
this Order within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, so that the
Court can issue a public version of this decision.
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers in Miami,Florida, th' day of August,
2013.
L M . W ILLIAMS
UNITED TATES DISTRICT JUDGF
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